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**MARXISM  
AND  
PSYCHOANALYSIS**

**Paul A. Baran**

*Cover : Subodh Das*

Publication of *Psyche and Society* (PAS) started from May, 2003 as a bi-annual journal of Pavlov Institute, 98, M.G. Road, Kolkata-700 007, Ph. 2241-2935, a Registered Society Under Societies' Registration Act, XXI of 1860 (Vide Reg. No. S/20300). The Journal will be available in the first week of May and December each year. PAS publishes articles in the fields of Biology, Sociology, Psychology and Psychiatry. Manuscripts for publication should be sent to the Editor, *Psyche and Society*, 98, M.G. Road, Kolkata-700 007. Communications, letters to the Editor and book reviews may also be sent to our e-mail address : r14.@rediff mail.com

Each issue is priced Rupees twenty five (Rs. 25/-) only, and the annual subscription Rupees fifty (Rs. 50/-) only inclusive of ordinary (Book Post) postal charges. Subscription may be sent by M.O./DD/A/c. Payee Cheque (Kolkata only) in favour of **Pavlov Institute and Hospitals.**

### Editorial

("The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, industrially the image of its own future." Preface, *Capital*, Marx)

### Truth is difficult ...

The bank of 'Roop-Narayan' awakened us again. A few pledges appeared very indecently, which was anticipated by Marx-Lenin and written long ago. We are the incapable, worthless, ineligible, incompetent, unable, unskilled, unqualified, egoistic, self-seeking and opportunist follower of them. In effect, we have weltered their shown ideal on the ground, once again. We know that globalization is thriving all round the world and we wouldn't be able to avoid that in this state and country. Apart, industrialization is compulsory for an universal socio-economical development. We also desirous for industrialization in this state; but ... .

One thing is certain: at the beginning of what we recognize as the industrial revolution-or, more precisely, their industrial revolutions - the Western countries had behind us many years-in some cases centuries-of social, political, and also incipient economic development. It follows that these older units of the European community must have had a long period of development and rise before the coming of the economic and technological revolutions.

Yes, finance capital would be invested and expanded freely as its preference, not as per our sweet will, that's why in our poor, postponed society, we have to pay for a price, a harsh price. Since that is a veracity. The same price we have paid on the 14th March, 2007, and the history of innocent-mass-killing at Nandigram of east Midnapore stand as witness of it. The day Salim Group, the very upholder of the massacre of Indonesian Communists in Iacs, selected the Nandigram area reflecting from the map of the State, the misfortune of the poor people of that area initiated from that very day. They were wakeful for night after nights in the panic of being evicted, because that was their right encounter for existence. Possibly they have reinstated themselves for this time, by immolating several lives. And the future stands under the disposal of the future generation.

We understand that apprehension and panic makes a man more dead than alive. Still the encounter by the people of Nandigram is fit to be remembered in the history of encounters of the poor people of Bengal.

Red Salute to the people of Nandigram! Simply we are kneeling down and praying with our folded hands for a mercy once only, to the civilized barbarous, heartless, inhuman people like us.

We will forget this incident. Since we can't escape and proceed forward, without omitting. Besides, it was divulged by Gurudev that not to have faith in humanity is a sin. Though we are having somewhat collection, for gossiping to the future generation. Even we realized each other's position also. We have perceived in new shapes and images that we simply represent our class just!

Though needless to say as an obligation to the humanity, ethics, morality and education of the future generation that we shouldn't ever forget that the Nandigram at the bank of 'Roop-Narayan' is not a dream, but an integration of momentary truth and universal truth in our struggle for existence. **PAS**

## Tagore-Einstein Dialogue: Two Planets Engaged In a Chat

Ashish Lahiri

Tagore's famous tete-a-tete with Einstein on July 14, 1930 at Berlin has assumed renewed importance recently. However, before dwelling on the problems and the dilemmas addressed by these two great men, let us clarify a few facts. The first is that the published version ('EINSTEIN AND TAGORE PLUMB THE DEPTHS OF REALITY / Scientist and Poet Exchange Thoughts on the Possibility of its Existence without Relation to Humanity' by Dmitri Marianoff, Berlin, *New York Times*, 10 August, 1930) of the celebrated conversation between the two presents some difficulties. To any percipient reader it should be clear that throughout the talk, Tagore is eloquent and expansive, while Einstein is rather abrupt, often unresponsive, speaking more in staccato phrases than in well-connected sentences. It is noteworthy that during the conversation Dmitri Marianoff, who was to be Einstein's son-in-law, was present and he observed: '... it seemed to an observer as though two planets were engaged in a chat.'<sup>1</sup> Einstein himself said in a letter that 'My conversation with Tagore was rather unsuccessful because of difficulties of communication and should, of course, never have been published.'<sup>2</sup> Dr. Sisir Kumar Das writes, 'About Einstein's resentment about its publication Andrew Robinson writes in a letter dated 5 January, 1955 (published in *The Statesman*, Delhi, 24 January 1995): "A letter from the *New York Times* to Tagore dated July 12 makes it clear that Einstein sent and approved the text of the conversation before publication. Yet in October 1930 Einstein wrote to Romain Rolland that the July 14 conversation "should of course, never have been published," as if it had appeared without his consent.'<sup>3</sup> Why was Einstein so hesitant and unhappy about publishing the conversation, which contrasts strangely with the eagerness with which Tagore and his friends published it?

Dr. Dipankar Chattopadhyay has examined this issue in some detail. He notes that another version of the talk, called the 'Authorized Version' was published in the January 1931 issue of the *Modern Review*, Calcutta. One can presume that this version was 'revised' by Tagore. The two versions have significant differences. While Tagore's sentences have had the benefit of being refined through revisions, Einstein's have not. Moreover, there are important theoretical shifts too, particularly on Tagore's side. Overall, the published accounts of the conversation were a bit unfair to Einstein.

Chattopadhyay also notes that on the request of Romain Rolland, Einstein agreed to write a contribution to *The Golden Book of Tagore* in 1931. 'Initially it was decided that he would write on the duties of intellectuals against war. However, Einstein changed the subject absolutely and instead wrote an article titled *About Free Will*. ... This article is tinged with some irony, which might be a result of Einstein's dissatisfaction with the conversation.' Einstein's article begins with the observation that:

If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way round the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it would travel its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once for all.<sup>4</sup>

This had indeed been the axis round which the 'conversation' had spiralled: consciousness and natural laws. There we find Tagore repeatedly emphasizing the classical Berkleian

stand that sense-data had no 'real' significance, that reality existed only in the consciousness of what he called 'Universal Man.' Einstein was very much familiar with this syllogism: he was well versed in Berkeley. However, in 1930, when this conversation took place, he had become too much of a 'realist' to take that. If we trace the history of the development of Einstein's philosophy of science, we find that by the 1920's he had given up his earlier neo-positivist, Machian stand that science could legitimately deal only with observed facts and relationships, and not about generalizations, that anything beyond observed facts was anathema to science. To quote Steven Weinberg, "Einstein's 1905 paper on special relativity shows the obvious influence of Mach; ... Einstein acknowledged his debt to Mach; in a letter to him a few years later, he called himself 'your devoted student.'<sup>5</sup> However, by 1922 Einstein had grown out of Mach's neo-positivism: 'in a Paris lecture in 1922, Einstein referred to Mach as 'un bon mécanicien' but a 'deplorable philosophe.'<sup>6</sup> Heisenberg recounts that by 1926 Einstein 'thought that every theory in fact contains unobservable quantities. The principle of employing only observable quantities simply cannot be consistently carried out.' This was patently opposed to Mach's philosophy to which Einstein had earlier subscribed. When Heisenberg pointed this out, Einstein 'answered simply: "perhaps I did use such philosophy earlier, and also wrote it, but it is nonsense all the same."'<sup>7</sup>

Thus, when Einstein and Tagore were 'plumbing the truth' and enquiring whether reality could exist 'without relation to humanity', Einstein had clearly moved away from Machian neo-positivism and embraced realism. That means 1) he was convinced that the universe was real in the sense that it was potentially 'knowable' by applying the scientific method, and 2) theorizing beyond strictly observed facts was not incompatible with scientific rigour.

That change of stand also lay at the root of Einstein's discomfort with Quantum Mechanics which depicted a probabilistic as against a deterministic picture of nature. Heisenberg, one of the chief proponents of this probabilistic view, had been comforted by Tagore two years earlier by asserting that the principle of uncertainty had its philosophical analogue in some strand of Upanishadic thought. Herein lay Einstein's dilemma. He was too great a mathematician and physicist not to agree with Heisenberg's principle; but, philosophically he was an absolute realist, which meant he believed that the senses could deliver us a true — not a probabilistic — picture of reality, provided we had the right theories and the right methodology. However, this was only a belief. Even at the end of his life, he could not resolve this conflict. Thus, we find the curious phenomenon that an idealist poet was arguing in terms of *logic*, and a realist scientist was confessing that 'This is my belief, although I know well that it is not fully demonstrable.'

What is the essence of that belief? In his article in *The Golden Book of Tagore*, Einstein says: 'Man defends himself from being regarded as an impotent object in the course of the universe. But should the lawfulness of happenings, such as unveils itself more or less clearly in inorganic nature, cease to function in front of the activities in our brain?' He points out that 'alcohol and other sharply controllable factors' do have an influence 'on our thoughts, feelings, and activities.' Therefore, 'determinism does not stop before the mystery of human will.'<sup>8</sup>

This was an obvious retort to Tagore's stand that 'the infinite personality of man comprehends the universe. There cannot be anything that cannot be subsumed by the human personality, and this proves that the truth of the universe is human truth.' Einstein talks about 'two different conceptions about the nature of the universe — the world as a unity dependent on humanity, and the world as reality independent of the human factor.' To this Tagore's riposte is the classical relativist stand that 'the world apart from us does not exist; it is a relative world, depending for its reality upon our consciousness.' Maybe twenty years earlier Einstein might have found much in this to agree with, but not now, when he had become a hard core 'realist.'

To continue with the philosophical duel, Einstein is ready to concede that concepts like 'beauty' are human-specific, but scientific 'truth' is not. Tagore explains beauty as 'the ideal of perfect harmony, which is the universal being.' One becomes increasingly aware of Tagore's unconcern for scientific methodology, about what constitutes 'scientific truth'. He does not seem to appreciate that as a working scientist Einstein's primary duty is to be true to his method. The scientist cannot follow the dictates of his mind, unless these were commensurate with his mathematics and his method. That is why he could not deny the worth of quantum mechanics, even as he was strongly opposed to it philosophically. Not so with Tagore. He was not answerable to scientific rigour. He was free to follow the dictates of his creative soul. Thus, he could easily say: 'Truth must be essentially human.' This is very definitely wrong as far as the logic and the method of science is concerned. The utmost concern of science is to make its findings independent of humans. That it often fails to achieve this level of objectivity is of course another matter.

Tagore, however, does not dismiss the difference between scientific truth and what he hypothetically calls the 'universal truth.' On the contrary, he agrees that there are two kinds of truth: one scientific, the other universal. He acknowledges that scientific truth 'can only be reached through the process of logic'; but that very logic is only 'human'; hence scientific truth is dependent on humans. Scientific truth is merely human truth, nothing beyond that. The obvious corollary is that science, human-dependent as it is, cannot lead us to an objective understanding of the world. No wonder he ends up denying the reality of the universe by invoking Maya: 'what appears to be true to the human mind, and therefore is human, may be called Maya, or illusion.'

This may be very subtle philosophy, but for a working scientist, this must be stupefying. One can almost see why Einstein thought this interview should not have been published. For the two were talking at cross-purposes: one was talking about how to account for the real universe of which man was only a part, the other talking about 'merging the individual in its infinity'. 'Two planets' were indeed chatting from their individual orbits!

One more point about Tagore's Maya logic. Although steeped in the Upanishads, Tagore, just like his father, was by no means a *mayavadi*. So much of his poetry and other works are critical of those who see this world as an illusion. Why then this departure from his professed stand? One feels that here, in this specific instance, he was carried over by his own philosophical logic. That was his own dilemma: how to reconcile 'scientific truth' with 'universal truth'? He was very much aware of the value of 'scientific truth', but at the same time, he was wedded to the concept of a 'universal truth'. Maya provided him with an easy and obvious route out of this impasse.

Einstein's dilemma was different: how to reconcile the mathematically irrefutable conclusions of probabilistic quantum mechanics with his realistic and deterministic conviction? He is unable to resolve this contradiction, but unlike the poet, does not seek an illusory resolution. He simply accepts the contradiction and the agony. Thus, while contributing to *The Golden Book of Tagore* a few months later, Einstein simply expressed his 'conviction', without taking recourse to the principle of demonstrability:

It is my conviction, although I know well that it is *not fully demonstrable*. If one thinks out to the very last consequence what one exactly knows and understands, there would hardly be any human being who would be impervious to this view, provided his self-love did not ruffle up against it.<sup>9</sup> (Italics added).

The last few words probably account for what Chattopadhyay characterizes as 'ironical.' That also explains the concluding words of Einstein in the July interview: 'Then I am more religious than you are!' What he means is, as a realist scientist, he is a 'believer' in the

'knowability' of the universe, so he does not have to subscribe to cosmic scepticism, whereas Tagore, believing in an inscrutable 'Brahman', is a victim of that.

The question needs to be raised: why was Tagore so un-characteristically stubborn in his stand? One might hazard the surmise that in order to reconcile his cosmic scepticism with his Upanishadic belief in the absolute, he was trying to defend the indefensible.

#### References

- 1 Dipankar Chattopadhyay, *Rabindranath O Vigyan*, Ananda, Kolkata, 2000, p. 243 (Translation mine)
- 2 *ibid*, p. 245
- 3 Sisir Kumar Das (ed.), *The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore*, Volume III, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 1996, p. 1010
- 4 *The Golden Book of Tagore*, (1931), 1990 reprint, Rammohun Library & Free Reading Room, Calcutta, p. 12
- 5 Steven Weinberg, *Dreams of a Final Theory*, 1993, p. 139
- 6 *ibid*, p. 143
- 7 *ibid*
- 8 *The Golden Book of Tagore*, p. 12
- 9 Op. cit. **P A S**

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## The Politics Behind the Rowlatt Act (1919)

Subhendu Sarkar

The British imperialists could not comprehend the reason behind the growth of the Indian revolutionary struggle. Initially they were under the false impression that the revolutionary movement was the consequence of the first Partition of Bengal (1905). The secret societies with the objective of liberating India through armed rising were, however, active since 1902. It was only during the Swadeshi movement that the radical ideas gained wider acceptance, particularly among the youth. The numerous societies, in and out of Bengal, succeeded, to a considerable extent, in stimulating a large section of the anti-Partition agitators to wage an anti-imperialist war. When even after the India Councils Act (1909) and the subsequent annulment of Partition (1911), the revolutionary activities continued, the imperialists began treating it differently. Several inquiries (for example, F.C. Daly's Report in 1911, Charles Tegart's Report in 1913, J.C. Nixon's Report and J.E. Armstrong's Report in 1917) were made so as to understand the nature and growth of what is called 'revolutionary terrorism'. Introducing repressive laws to tackle revolutionary terrorism (for example, Seditious Meetings Act in 1907, the Newspapers Act in 1908, the Press Act in 1910 and the Defence of India Act in 1915) had already become a custom but the final blow came in the form of the Rowlatt Act (1919) embodying the recommendations of the Sedition Committee (1918) under Justice S.A.T. Rowlatt. As a full-length inquiry into the Indian revolutionary movement was already available to and extensively used by the Sedition Committee, James Campbell Ker's *Political Trouble in India 1907-1917* (1917) has its own importance. Ker was entrusted with the task of compiling this work when he was on special duty at the Army Headquarters, Simla. A study of these two works is worth attempting, chiefly for two reasons: (a) though the writings on the history of the revolutionary movement have been enriched by the accounts supplied by several participants and subsequent researches conducted by scholars, the two above-mentioned works remain the first attempts at documenting revolutionary terrorism in India (the earlier Reports dealt with revolutionary activities of some particular area and did not cover a period of years) and (b) both provide excellent examples of how imperialist attitude prevails even in objective

documentation. Moreover, the Report of the Sedition Committee exhibits how the British tried and succeeded in repressing a movement directed towards liberating India. What follows, therefore, is a discussion on what Ker and the Sedition Committee had to say about certain seminal issues related to the revolutionary movement. For the sake of convenience, this study is confined to Bengal only.

I

Propaganda through literature was an integral part of the revolutionary movement in the wake of the Partition of Bengal. Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's novel *Anandamath* (1882) had a perennial influence on the youth with a vision to overthrow the colonial rule in India. The Sedition Committee reports:

A song, however, which was extracted from a popular Bengali novel [*Anandamath*], has since become famous as "Bande Mataram" (Hail to thee, Oh Mother! or as now generally translated, "Hail Motherland!"). The novel had been written many years previously, and the song hitherto had excited no particular emotion, but now gradually it was raised to the rank of a national anthem.

Ker informs about the impact of *Anandamath*:

Many ideas were afterwards borrowed from this novel by the leaders of the Bengal revolutionary societies, and the special vow taken by the members of the Anusilan Samiti of Dacca was practically the same as that imposed upon the Children [santans]. The greeting "Bande Mataram" became the war-cry of the extremist party in Bengal; it was raised at political meetings to welcome popular leaders and to express approval of particularly exciting passages in their speeches, and also occasionally as a shout of defiance of Europeans in the streets. The *Bande Mataram* song was also very frequently sung at political gatherings. (30)

Ker, however, did not forget to add, "there are many passages in his [Bankim's] works which show that he was fully alive to the benefits of settled government under British rule." (30) This is a roundabout manner of justifying British imperialism.

The pamphlet directly inspired by *Anandamath* was *Bhawani Mandir* (1905), written by Aurobindo Ghose (later Sri Aurobindo). Before reprinting it, Ker says: "The pamphlet is of a great interest as it explains the ideas underlying the revolutionary movement centred in the Maniktolla conspiracy, particularly the establishment of a sort of monastic retreat, or Ashram as it is called, for the teaching of revolutionary work." (31) The comment of the Sedition Committee, however, is far from being objective.

The *Bhawani Mandir* (temple of Bhawani, one of the manifestations of the goddess Kali) exalts Bhawani as the manifestation of Sakti. Indians must acquire mental, physical, moral and spiritual strength. They must copy the methods of Japan. They must draw strength from religion. How this is to be done is described in moving and powerful terms. The book is a remarkable instance of perversion of religious ideals to political purposes. (23-24)

Another pamphlet, *Bartaman Rananiti* (1907), written by Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya, preaching war against imperialism attracted immediate notice of the British. Ker reports that it was "the principal revolutionary text-book; 394 copies were found in the Maniktolla Garden, and it was, as the issue register showed, one of the most popular books in the Dacca Anusilan Samiti Library." (47)

*Mukti Kon Pathe*, published about the same time is, in fact, a collection of articles from the *Yugantar*. It served as a handbook providing the objects of training of the revolutionaries and the programmes the leaders should adopt for collecting men, money and arms. The concept of political dacoity and winning over the native soldiers serving the Government were also enumerated in it.

Among newspapers, the *Yugantar* had been a source of constant indignation for the British since its first appearance in 1906. Ker states:

The paper was seditious from the very start, but before being prosecuted it received on June 7th, 1907 a warning from the Government of Bengal in respect of an article which appeared in the issue of 2nd of June. (62)

The warning, however, had no effect. As a consequence, Bhupendranath Dutta was prosecuted as the editor of the *Yugantar*, convicted on 24 July 1907 by Mr. Douglas H. Kingsford and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The press remained active even after it was confiscated. Two more trials had to be instituted. Mr. Kingsford, while passing judgment on Baikuntanath Acharya, who declared himself the printer and publisher of the *Yugantar*, on 16 January 1908 remarked, as Ker quotes:

I need only add that the history of *Yugantar* during the last few months exhibits the impotence of Government to deal with this class of publication under the existing law. In the interests of good Government and good order the paper ought to have been suppressed. It is difficult to measure the harm which is likely to result from such an article as that charged, when it is translated and circulated, as presumably it is intended to be, amongst those to whom it was ostensibly addressed. (64)

The Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act was passed on 8 June 1908 in order to deal with such revolutionary propaganda. It provided for the forfeiture of presses in which newspapers containing incitements to murder, or to any offence under the Explosives Substances Act, 1908, or to any act of violence, were printed. This brought the *Yugantar* to an end. The revolutionaries, however, continued putting forth their ideas. The Sedition Committee states:

... though the *Jugantar* had disappeared, other newspapers continued to vilify the British régime, and pamphlets of the most fanatical and bloodthirsty character were circulated. We are convinced that these publications produced ever a new succession of instruments of murder and outrage... (194)

Brahmabandhav Upadhyay's *Sandhya* was equally anti-imperialist in tone and language. Ker writes:

The title of the paper means "Twilight", and the point of it may be found in a remark made in the paper in September, 1907, warning the English that after passing of the *Sandhya* comes nightfall when the squaring of accounts with the Feringhi will begin. The paper was extremely seditious and fanatical, and in August, 1907, proceedings were taken against it; the manager Saroda Chandra Sen was arrested on the 29th, and the editor Brahmo Bandhab Upadhyaya and the printer and publisher Hari Charan Das on September 3rd. While the case was still pending the editor died, on November 18th the case against the others were withdrawn as they explained that they had been entirely under the influence of the deceased, admitted that the articles charged were both scurrilous and seditious, and tendered an apology to the Government of Bengal. (71)

On 21 January 1909 the "Classic Press" where the paper was printed was forfeited following the proceedings taken under the Newspapers Act.

The English daily, *Bande Mataram* started in 1906 by Aurobindo Ghose and Bipin Chandra Pal came under the surveillance of the British as well. Unlike the *Yugantar*, which appealed to the masses in a fluent colloquial Bengali, the *Bande Mataram* was directed towards the English-knowing educated readers. As it was closely connected with the *Yugantar*, the characteristic attitude of the imperialists is evident in Ker's words: "In 1908 Abinash Chandra Bhattacharji, who was proved in the second *Yugantar* case to be the manager, was found to be living in the same house with Arabindo Ghose, and the *Bande Mataram* occasionally republished from its disreputable vernacular contemporary [the *Yugantar*]." (75-76)

When the Newspapers Act failed to check the flow of revolutionary writings, the British came out with the Press Act (1910). The Sedition Committee notes:

By the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act, 1908, power was given to forfeit presses used for publishing newspapers inciting to certain offences, with the result that the *Jugantar* soon ceased to appear. By the Act of 1910, security might be required from the keeper of any printing press. This Act drove much of the seditious literature to secret presses. (48)

The Government Member who moved the Bill that eventually became the Press Act of 1910 said, as quoted by the Sedition Committee:

These things are the natural and ordinary consequence of the teachings of certain journals. They have prepared the soil on which anarchy flourishes; they have sown the seed, and they are answerable for the crop. (194)

The bulk of writings that issued from the secret presses comprised leaflets and were, more often than not, directly responsible for the actions perpetrated by the revolutionaries. The Sedition Committee was not unaware of the connection:

The connection between this leaflet literature and the outrages has over and over again been accepted and dwelt upon by the courts. These leaflets embody a propaganda of bloodthirsty fanaticism directed against the Europeans and all who assist them. (108)

This is an attempt to turn the issue of anti-imperialism into racism.

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The revolutionary actions in Bengal started in 1906 with more than one abortive effort at assassinating Sir Bampfylde Fuller, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal. But the colonial Government had no idea of the activities of the revolutionary groups even after Barindra Ghose, Bibhuti Bhushan Sarkar and Prafulla Chaki laid a mine on 6 December 1907 to blow up the train near Kharagpur carrying the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Andrew Fraser from Orissa to Calcutta. This was, in fact, their third attempt that failed as well. The police arrested eight coolies in relation to the explosion; six of them were convicted and sent to jail. It was only after the Muzaffarpur murders in 1908 that the British realized the role of the revolutionaries behind such incidents. The bomb was thrown into a carriage of Mrs. and Miss Kennedy, the wife and daughter of a local barrister, though it was actually intended for the District Judge Kingsford who had been transferred from Calcutta to Muzaffarpur. Ker informs:

According to the statements of conspirators afterwards arrested, and of Khudiram Bose who actually threw the bomb, Mr. Kingsford's life was attempted because, as Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, he had tried cases against the *Yugantar*, *Bande Mataram*, *Sandhya* and *Navasakti* newspapers, and convicted persons connected with them. (123)

It was during the investigations that a previous attempt on the life of Kingsford came to light. The bombing at Muzaffarpur and at several other places about the same time resulted in searches by the detective department in a garden at Maniktala and seven other places on 2 May 1908. Ker reports:

Buried underground or stored in boxes at various places in the garden were a few guns and sporting rifles and light revolvers, as well as a forge and other machinery for making bombs, and large quantities of acids for preparing explosives. There was also one finished bomb ready for use, besides large quantities of picric acid already prepared, dynamite cartridges, and 25 lbs. of dynamite. In addition there was a large amount of printed matter and correspondence, including books upon explosives and military training. Marks of revolver bullets on targets of whitewash on the trees of the garden indicated that revolver shooting was also practiced. The search in short showed that the garden was a regular school for practical instruction in revolutionary methods and in the manufacture of explosives, and a cyclostyled text-book was found

giving in minute detailed instructions for preparing explosives and bombs. (126-27)

As a result of these searches thirty-four persons were arrested; later a few others were rounded up. Narendranath Gosain who turned approver was shot dead by Satyendranath Bose and Kanailal Dutta, both of whom were afterwards executed. Aurobindo Ghose was finally acquitted. The Sedition Committee informs:

Fifteen were ultimately found guilty of conspiracy to wage war against the King-Emperor, including Barindra Kumar Ghosh, ... one of the most active founders of the criminal revolutionary movement in Bengal, Hem Chandra Das, the manufacturer of the bomb which killed Mrs. and Miss Kennedy and another who made the statement ... and confirmed as to the sending of a bomb in a parcel to Mr. Kingsford. The trial in this case is known as the Alipore conspiracy case. (32-33)

The revolutionary activities, however, did not stop even after the judgment. In fact, murders of approvers and the police officers along with dacoities to raise fund became a regular feature in Bengal. It is interesting to note how the Sedition Committee has differentiated revolutionary terrorism from non-political crimes:

In the first place as regards the political character of the outrages ... there are of course certain classes of outrage which by their very nature proclaim themselves as revolutionary. Murder by bomb is practically certain to be of this character. So too are murders or attempted murders of magistrates, police officers or informers, actual or suspected, connected with the detection or persecution of persons accused of revolutionary crime. But even in the case of mere robbery or murder in the course of robbery there are certain features, the persistent recurrence of which at once distinguishes these crimes from those committed by ordinary criminals and connects them with each other. ... The persons committing these outrages were usually young men of the bhadralok class. They are often reported as speaking in English or in the vernacular as spoken by person of bhadralok position. (26)

It is this educated youth of Bengal that, without proper leadership and a definite ideological programme for the future, launched for the first time an anti-imperialist struggle with a vision to liberate India. In spite of the introduction of one repressive Act after another, they continued propagating ideas of militant nationalism, sought alliance with countries inimical to Britain, won over troops, collected revolvers, threw bombs and indulged in political dacoities.

While Ker records the revolutionary activities from 1907 to 1917, the Sedition Committee reports, both in narrative and tabular form, all the major and minor incidents in Bengal and their consequences during the period 1906-1917. It, at once, indicates the nature and extent of revolutionary terrorism that had been an issue of major concern to the British and how they dealt with it. Here are two examples. The Sedition Committee writes:

In July 1910, in consequence of the prevalence of anarchical crime in Dacca district, proceedings were instituted in Dacca city against a number of persons charging them with conspiracy to wage war against the King. Among them was Pulin Behari Das, who had been deported in November 1908, but had been allowed to return at the beginning of 1910. Forty-four accused were eventually brought to trial, and 15 found guilty sentenced to terms of imprisonment varying from 7 to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment. In the case of Pulin Behari Das the sentence was 7 years. (46)

The High Court judge, Mr. Justice Harrington who affirmed the findings of the Sessions Judge, remarked, as Ker quotes:

The result of the oral and documentary evidence is to show that the Dacca Anusilan Samiti was formed having for its ostensible object the improvement of Bengali youth by the promotion of discipline and physical exercise - but that, behind this ostensible and open object, there was a secret object known to those in positions of importance and authority but not necessarily

confided to the younger and less dependable members. That secret object was to bring about a revolution and subvert the government by force, and to this end the Samiti followed the lines laid down in the *Mukti Kon Pathe* both in the system on which it was founded, and, in one case at least, in the nature of the crime against property which its members committed. (140)

Another important event in the history of the revolutionary activities in Bengal is the theft of Mauser pistols from Rodda & Co. in 1914. According to the Sedition Committee:

The theft of pistols from Rodda & Co., a firm of gunmakers in Calcutta, was an event of the greatest importance of revolutionary crime in Bengal. On Wednesday, the 26th August 1914, the clerk of Rodda & Co. whose duty it was to clear imports of arms and ammunition at the Custom office, had cleared 202 cases of arms and ammunition, but had brought only 192 cases to his employer's warehouse in Vansittart Row. He had soon left, saying that he was going to bring the remainder. He never returned and after three days the case was reported to the police. The 10 missing cases contained 50 Mauser pistols and 46,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition for the same ... The authorities have reliable information to show 44 of these pistols were almost at once distributed to 9 different revolutionary groups in Bengal, and it is certain that the pistols so distributed were used in 54 cases of dacoity or murder or attempts at dacoity and murder subsequent to August 1914. (66)

Ker informs that the clerk of Rodda & Co., Sirish Chandra Mitter was already a suspect as four months prior to the theft his house had been searched in connection with a plot to murder two Europeans in Calcutta.

Indian revolutionaries had been operating from abroad since 1905. England, Germany, France and the USA had become centres of their network. But it was actually the First World War (1914-18) that opened up immense possibilities for them. With the help of countries hostile to Britain, particularly Germany, they tried to overthrow the colonial rule in India. Several attempts were made to import arms and money with the assistance of the Germans. But the British succeeded in suppressing all these plots, partly with the help of 'Indian loyalty' and partly by resorting to 'extraordinary legislation' after breaking out of the First World War like Foreigners Ordinance and Ingress into India Act in 1914 and the Defence of India Act in 1915.

### III

The two objectives of appointing the Sedition Committee were: (i) to investigate and report on the nature and extent of the criminal conspiracies connected with the revolutionary movement in India, and (ii) to examine and consider the difficulties that have arisen in dealing with such conspiracies and to advise as to the legislation, if any, necessary to enable Government to deal effectively with them. So far the first part has been dealt with. Now something about the second part.

The Sedition Committee mentions several difficulties that the Government in India faced in tackling revolutionary terrorism during the period 1906-1917. They are: want of evidence ('there have been 91 dacoities since 1907, of which 16 were accompanied by murder, and from January 1st, 1915, to June 30th, 1916, there were 14 murders, 8 of them being of police officers, for which it has not been possible to put anyone upon trial.' (182)), paucity of police ('A police station in Bengal has an average area of 110 square miles, but many of them have more than 250 square miles and some as many as 500. There is sometimes only one investigating officer attached to a police-station, though in most cases he has two or more additional officers to assist.' (182-83)), facilities enjoyed by criminals ('... the districts in which the police ... have to work consist of scattered villages often accessible during the rains in Eastern Bengal by water only ... With regard to outrages in towns the character of irregular streets with their open-fronted shops and dwellings must be borne in mind.' (183)), difficulty

in proof of possession of arms ('Where incriminating articles such as arms or documents are found it is often hard to bring home the possession to any particular individuals.' (183)), distrust of evidence ('... even where a prisoner has confessed before a magistrate in any way that makes his statement evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, it is common for his advocate at the trial formally and seriously to "retract" the statement for him.' (184)), useless confessions ('Confessions made to the police are not evidence.' (184)) and the length of trials ('The opportunity for exercising terrorism is increased by the remarkable length of trials in India. All conspiracy cases are necessarily long, as a large number of people have to be separately connected with the offence charged and each overt act has to be proved as a separate case.' (190))

To encounter these difficulties, the Sedition Committee proposed measures, both punitive and preventive, to be incorporated in general law or to be used in case of emergency. Permanent punitive measures included several amendments in laws regarding evidence or procedure and substantive law of sedition, particularly the Defence of India Act under which the rules were made which not only authorized the arrest and internment of dangerous persons but also introduced trial by Special Tribunals without appeal. The most significant emergency punitive measure advocated was "the trial of seditious crime by Benches of three Judges without juries or assessors and without preliminary commitment proceedings or appeal." (201) As for the preventive measures the Committee was in favour of continuing of the Defence of India Act even after its expiry after the First World War. The necessity for its continuance has been put forward envisaging similar revolutionary movements in the future.

By those means alone has the conspiracy been paralysed for the present, and we are unable to devise any expedient operating according to strict judicial forms which can be relied upon to prevent its reviving, to check if it does revive, or, in the last resort, to suppress it anew. This will involve some infringement of the rules normally safeguarding the liberty of the subject. (205)

These recommendations embodied in the Rowlatt Act were rushed through the Imperial Legislative Council between 6 February and 18 March 1919, against the unanimous opposition of all non-official Indian members. Sumit Sarkar points out that "Representing an attempt to make war-time restrictions on civil rights permanent through a system of special courts and detention without trial for a maximum of two years (even for actions like mere possession of tracts declared to be seditious), the Act was probably a bid to conciliate the considerable segment of official and non-official white opinion which had resented Montagu's liberal promises and the grant of dyarchy." (187) But more than that the Rowlatt Act was designed to stifle the revolutionary movement that posed a serious threat to the imperialist mission of the British. Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919 were nothing but an example of imperialist machination of rallying the Moderates before coming down heavily on the revolutionaries who had already deviated from the policy of mendicancy by preferring to tread the radical path. But the British failed to gauge the changed scenario. They thought, by suppressing revolutionary terrorism and working out certain changes administratively, like providing opportunity of health and employment to the revolutionaries and introducing institutions for their reformation, they could continue ruling India peacefully for a long period. But the history of the Indian people's struggle against imperialism took a different course. It is a paradox that the Rowlatt Act which was meant to strangle all methods of radical protest, generated, for the first time in reality, the mass awakening in the form of Rowlatt Satyagraha under the leadership of Gandhi. But that is a different episode altogether.

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PAS

## Psychiatrist Dhirendranath

(Continued article - 8th part)

Basu Dev Mukherjee

[We consider Dhirendranath as one of the leading pioneers of psychiatry in India. In the previous issues of this magazine we had included the intellectual formation and socio-psychological development of Dhirendranath as a psychiatrist. He had many introductions but over all other introductions, being a psychiatrist can claim of the fundamental ones. We will continue to examine the matter further in this issue regarding his achievement as a psychiatrist in practice due to wholistic participation in the subject. Ed. PAS.]

### Depression


Dhirendranath had acknowledged the matter of the overall problem of depression much later and also admitted that, now-a-days this disease is getting manifested even in the children and young boys and girls. Towards the end of his professional life he used to also admit that, he was perhaps getting a greater number of patients of depression those days. But it is also true that, there were not many medicines of depression when he started the treatment. We have heard from the very mouth of the patients that, he used to treat only with suggestions and get good result. Later on the qualitative standard of his treatment too got largely uplifted due to the arrival of a number of medicines in the market. Simultaneously, the trouble caused by suffering from this disease for a long time was also reduced. He had the very conception that the arrangements for the treatment of anxiety and depression in our public hospitals are the poorest of all.

He maintained an opinion of the following kind while classifying this disease. As for example, there is a certain type of patients who suffer simultaneously from depression and also other common varieties of psychitric diseases viz. personality disorder, chronic anxiety state, paranoia, drug-addiction, chronic fatigue syndrome etc.. Dhirendranath had the very idea that in the following process of these diseases they come under the grip of depression. At times they exhibit all the signs and symptoms of depression while in other occasions, a mosaic pattern of various signs and symptoms can be noticed in the development of entire disease process. There is still another type of patients who suffer from depression and / or manic depressive psychosis and they directly present with this disease. He used to admit that, there are many patients of anxiety and depression among the total general population who remain out of our sight and don't even reach close to the physicians like the patients of diabetes or hypertension.

In this matter also he was biased towards training the primary care physicians just like

treating the psychosomatic patients. Especially in the cases of suicides, he was largely sure that, so many incidents of suicides occur due to that latent depression. In this context let me inform you that he was also sure about another matter that, the amount in which our psychiatrists use anti-psychotic medicines, entails depression as a side-effect in many patients and they use anti-depressants arbitrarily and randomly in order to overcome that. As a result of all these, the patient's disease becomes more complicated and chronic. That's why he repeatedly tried to know whether a patient had any other problem of psychiatric ailments before being certain that he was a patient of depression.

The chain of diseases of this depression was previously called 'affective disorder'. He didn't like that and preferred to address it as mood disorder. Because according to his conception, the main problem of these diseases was the disorder of mood. There is even no way of understanding this disorder from the patient's outside behaviour. In many instances it can be noticed that it can not be designated to any specific mould of a disease, instead it can be called as a definite sign and symptom of various diseases, on thoroughly considering the patient's abnormal behaviour. In case of the origin and development of this disease Dhirendranath used to think of a model of the following type:



We will be able to understand through this diagram that, we generally observe, the manifestation of various signs and symptoms of mood disorder, as the interpretation of depression. As a result we apprehend the patient's expressed behaviour as his disease. But practically various ingredients inside the patient's mind, make numerous complex interactions happen through building up his nature or Pavlovian brain type, almost from the foetal stage to result in the growth of this disease. As for example here, a person's environment in which he has grown up since his childhood, is very important.

In an identical manner, if he has got one or more innate defects, which we get via the heredity, that will become important. In this case it is noticed that, the women may become instinctively weak for having grown up in a socially or familially helpless situation. However, all this warp and woof constructs the brain-type in the next step i.e. of an adult person. In this perspective we come to know, how impulsive the person is and to what extent the environmental oppression on him makes him impulsive. If his brain is equilibrated in the Pavlovian sense, irrespective of the circumstances that may come, he will be able to excellently adjust with those adverse situations. But in this case too, even the equilibrated brain can break down, if the environmental oppression becomes too much.

One has to remember that, those who have a much more impulsive brain, have a far more sensitive limbic-diencephalic axis. That is, they come under the grip of an emotional injury with a mild blow and fail to adjust themselves properly in the perspective of the environment and the situation. Irrespective of the fact that the women are impulsive or not, the hydraulic pressure of the wordly affairs is adjusted towards their direction itself. So, she has to make more fitting and fixing in these issues from the childhood. Instinctively or innately the women folk try harder to adapt; but perhaps they too break down within themselves after reaching a certain stage.

In this context I can remember that, towards the end of his professional life, news of suicides, divorces, violent behaviour, anti-social activities occurring abundantly in the broken or transformed socialist countries, came pouring in. He tried to explain these issues with depression as a transitional crisis. Because he perceived that, many such patients of depression don't easily come to prominence with the disease and its symptoms. Instead of that they suffer in this latent state and precipitate with all the signs and symptoms of depression probably when some big incident happens.

Again in many instances it can be noticed that, a patient of depression appears with the signs and symptoms of different types of physical ailments. It becomes difficult to understand them, what his exact problem is or even if there are physical ailments which of them is his main problem. Which will be considered as his real problem, if he wants to reveal his physical problems to be the principal of all, yet no limbic or functional disorder anywhere in the body can be found on examination? Thoughts started to float all over again that, what is then the relation between the body and mind? That's why, the theory of the 'cortico-visceral' research received a stronger support in Pavlovian neuro-science.

Dhirendranath used to say that, depression is such a disease which makes it clear that a functional disorder is going on inside the entire brain due to the reaction of the abnormal mind. Then all of our diagnostic methodology should be thus that it becomes possible to search for the actions and reactions of the abnormal mind under an effective psycho-neurological arrangement in the perspective of the disorder of the brain. He used to also caution us that the problem of reductionism might enter our judicial or systematic methodology, as a result of it.

He used to emphasize that, in today's psychiatry, biological treatment i.e. a complete drug-dependent treatment has consequently gained in importance. The psychiatrists are gradually getting trapped in the temptation of new drugs. But according to Dhirendranath's remarks, perhaps the person has a past negative experience of his formative years. He was somehow keeping on going by managing that experience. It was noticed later on that, the person was showing the signs and symptoms of the disease due to an oppressive component (which is probably not enough for the making of the disease) occurred recently.

Under an in-depth consideration it can be understood that, the source of the pattern of the negative thinkings being manifested in the patient in this case, is far more inaccessible. Perhaps even the patient is not properly noticing that or noticing but not giving that importance. In this connection I can remember of an incident.

We saw an young man of depression in the middle of our those discussions. What Dhirendranath brought out, as the main reason of his depression rousing up his case-history within a few sittings was as following: The young man is now established in life and ought to live happily in a nuclear family with his wife and children. Then why is he having depression? We came to know that his mother had psychiatric problems; but outshining that he had a bigger problem of the severity of witnessing violent incidents within the family during his childhood. He had witnessed it within the family day after day in his childhood, so when he got the opportunity he escaped or separated himself and didn't want to keep any contact with

that family. His wife too doesn't want it because her husband feels oppressed.

But the boy's relatives now want to keep contact and intimacy with him. But he is becoming unable to tolerate this. He has tried to solve this matter within his self for many days; but has failed. On the contrary he has been sorely wounded. Now having failed to solve this entire matter and considering the solution as unattainable, he is trying to take refuge within the disease. Through these words Dhirendranath was trying to make us understand that, its treatment would happen in the reductionist approach if this entire matter was not remembered while giving the suggestions.

While we were having such discussions a fellow-student spoke up, "It's the same Sir, antipsychotic drugs at the up and the antidepressant at the down - .". With the utterance of these words he became aggrieved and said, "You people will be able to practice anything but Pavlovian psychiatry." This discussion didn't stop here. When a fellow-student has asked, "Tell me Sir, what is the meaning or value of defensive mechanism of this outburst of anger we observe in depression?" Dhirendranath's answer was also as though prepared, "The same value the dead assurance of an oppressed has when he is persecuted."

What he used to say with self-confidence in these cases is as following: The problem belongs to the area of the brain called limbic-diencephalic core from where the emotions such as our anger and fear are generated. Now when an excitation is produced, it should have the tendency of spreading (spread effect) according to the properties of the nerve cells, and it can not continue working as a permanent source of the excitation, getting confined or encircled only in that small area. According to his conception, the issue of this kind of undistinguished emotional disorder is applicable to the field of almost all mental illnesses. And whether the patient requires it or not the psychiatrists add one antidepressant to each prescription in order to manage this.

Dhirendranath also used to say that, the subject of the relationship between a mother and her child is the only acknowledged relation in biology and various emotional problems might grow if this relationship is confused; but one should not explain a clinical state of this type with any one incident or ingredient. Because when a person runs into an endogenetic or exogenetic problem he would try to get out of it in a similar manner both from the biological and psychological aspects. If he fails to do so, he would try to adapt with that problem. But in the process of this adaptation the homeostasis of his body and mind would perhaps get upset at a certain stage, as a result the disease would show up. That too would depend upon his brain-type.

Due to these reasons it will become evident that, the making of that person's disease becomes inevitable if there is not sufficient familial or social support and he has to keep on going by adjusting with his problems relying only on his own ability. Probably his disease would become chronic or relapse again and again. In this context it should be said that, the biggest problem of depression is that in this case the patient becomes as though a bundle or vessel of all the negative thoughts of the world and wordly affairs. Dhirendranath had the very aim of trying to veer these negative thoughts towards a positive direction through continuously giving suggestions.

Eventually, he perhaps used to give suggestions of the following type, "It's true that a certain man has caused you pain; but please try to remember that starting from your father and brother so many men have benefitted or are still doing so in your life. Actually we nurture only the negative matters within our mind to a greater extent because this is a matter of fear or insecurity; but if we reckon a little we will see that, the number of people who hold out their helping hands before us is a hundred times larger than the number of people who cause us pain or harm us and that's why we become able to live in the society. ..."

## Anxiety Neurosis

Anxiety is our final disease in the discussion of this series. The psychiatrists perhaps see this type of patients most. We generally say that – the disease of anxiety reveals as the core of all kinds of neurosis or minor psychiatric illness. In 1895 Freud first initiated the discussion in this matter and said that, this disease shows up as a result of improper emotional let out of the libido loitering inside the mind. But in this regard he gave no explanation or analysis about the method in which such a thing happens inside our mind. Later on, with the explanation of the *Theory of Neurosis*, that he presented ( Acute Anxiety) in this regard, it was considered to be justified to refer it as a fear or panic attack instead of anxiety. The problems of phobia, panic etc. come from this only. Later on (1926), it became evident that, Freud had completely changed his opinion about this disease and discarded all of his initial thoughts in his writings.

On the other hand, the psychologists and psychiatrists close to biology started saying after the establishment of Darwin's theory of 'Natural Selection' and 'local adaptation', that, anxiety is an innate attribute in the matter of a person's staying alive or protecting his existence. So when an animal runs to the apprehension of an internal or external fear, insecurity etc. while protecting its existence, it tries to endure by adapting anxiety, tension etc. in its body.

The individual can make out that he is feeling fear. Perhaps he can not properly realize exactly for which reason he is feeling this fear. Yet, he tries to assure himself in different ways to drive away this fear and time and again runs to the person who can assure him in this matter. There are certainly some individuals who are prone to anxiety. That is they become tensed for trivial reasons or for no reason at all. But in spite of understanding all these, Freud still sat idle, holding his developmental theory's incident of being oppressed or hurt in the childhood.

Dhirendranath used to judge anxiety according to the Pavlovian 'conditioned reflex theory'. But he used to consider the anxiety states e.g. phobia, panic, obsession etc. as the continuum process of a disease. Anxiety may occur as a reaction of the normal mind; but it remains confined to a certain limit, and it doesn't cross the limit. Likewise, the diseases we generally observe are a reaction of the abnormal mind. He used to say that, a portion of the ingredients that remain scattered within the family are viable to create unnecessary anxiety, is the familial teaching during the formative period and the rest is the effect of brain type.

It has been also noticed that, just a little anxiety tremendously helps in our everyday performance. But in most of the cases it is noticed that, anxiety remains mixed with other physical or psychological ailments. This anxiety sometimes makes psychosomatic diseases, sometimes somatizations disorder, sometimes various kinds of irrational fear and other times it may take an intense form and create terror also. This entire condition can be compared with the frightened or terrorized state and the fear of death also gets associated with this fearful emotion. Gradually this fear spreads in all directions. But in many cases this fear can not be related with real incidents.

The fear or insecurity during the formative period in the childhood, may be largely responsible for the making of this fearful emotion. E.g. this disease can take shape in the children if they don't get the appropriate assurance of dependance from the parents. On the other hand, in case of over protection or if the parents bring up the children with extra care, the little ones have much difficulty in the matter of facing any environment or situation, and hence unnecessary anxiety can grow in them. It has been noticed that, if there is too much dependance in case of any inter-relation or that mutual dependance is unreasonable, it may change to become a fearful relation or a relationship of excessive dependance.

The separation between the parents or their death can become an important factor in this matter. It is noticed that, anxiety gets initiated in the patient whenever any unknown or

unforeseen situation arrives. Even any kind of ominous apprehension in this matter can also grow in the patient. An oscillation in the issues of separation, the ability to restrain himself, independent thinking, possessiveness etc. keeps on going in the patient's mind. Even perversion of the person's thought process in these issues may also occur.

Dhirendranath tried to rectify this perversion in his treatment of psychotherapy. But he didn't hurt him directly. He tried to make him understand that he had no reason to get scared, he was unreasonably getting frightened. Certainly he used to learn, before giving this suggestion, what kind of personality type that person had and how much tolerance or bearing capacity he had. However, we notice more and more instances of diseases like post-traumatic stress disorder being mentioned in the text books compared to the occurrence of this type of diseases here. Instead of it, Dhirendranath used to get more patients of fear or panic, most of which used to be the fear of going out.

Then there used to be various types of fear. The fear of directly facing a situation, fear of examinations etc.. In case of all sorts of neurosis, fear as if develops a specific and regular division in our society. As a result we always have to judge this issue separately. That is, we have to see as if specially investigate what reaction the patient has in the matter of fear, just like we individually reckon the issues of emotion, motivation, memory etc.. It can be also noticed that, in the matter of the development of this fear, the familial and social reasons as if become more important than the latent weakness or warp and woof of a person's mind.

In this matter the words that are very important to say are that, these facts in this regard have not been told that emphatically in our Western textbooks. As a result our students can not learn this subject at all. If we have learnt any single elementary object about the diagnosis in our society from him, that is the lesson of marking the 'fear' and the source of the 'fear' in the patient.

In order to make us understand the form in which fear can come Dhirendranath used to say that, Deputy Magistrate Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay incurred the displeasure of the British, having branded them as an enemy in his novel 'Ananda Math'. He had to change the script bit by bit in each edition in fear of transfer and humiliation. This novel has six editions and in the final edition it was noticed that, he had branded the Muslim community as the enemy in place of the British. I doubt whether there is any other such a huge tragedy due to fear in Bengali Literature. We have seen before our eyes how 'fear' can make a person lose everything in all respect. I don't know whether it is done now-a-days; but in the past there was a kind of treatment done, called 'desensitization therapy' where a patient was given the highest stimulus in the very matter of his fear, in the name of Behaviour Therapy.

On hearing about such activities done by other psychiatrists from the mouth of certain patients, Dhirendranath becoming extremely aggrieved commented, "It is an inhumane torcher." I can remember that, once this thing was done tentatively with a middle-aged woman to treat her 'dirt phobia'. His view in lieu of it was that, we have to appeal before her cognitive system whatever time it takes after relaxing her. The improvement may be slow with that; but it will be much lasting and permanent and that is the most humane arrangement of treatment.

Incidentally, this part will be ended with the mention of obsession. Any psychiatrist perhaps gets patients of obsessive compulsive neurosis more in his daily practice. Dhirendranath had his own line of thinking about the disease and he used to try to find out on getting this type of patients, whether he had schizophrenia at his core! As if he used to think that, we observe obsession as a smaller edition of schizophrenia but when that reaches the insane stage through the flowing process of the disease, he takes the form of a schizophrenia patient. That's why, in case of treating the disease of obsession, he used to prescribe antidepressant alongwith antipsychotic in a more or less degree. The patients used to stay well with that.

## Psychotherapy

Dhirendranath was a self-styled psychiatrist and we can say that he was a self-styled psycho-therapist, because he has no formal training in psychotherapy. Another thing which should be said is that, he is not a model psychiatrist or psychotherapist. Because it is almost an impossible job to imitate or follow him. He is the harvest of a transitional age in this Bengal. He had done this job of treating mental illness along with other works like other great men of that era. We can not even imagine what would have happened if he had done only this job of treating mental illness like his master Pavlov.

Because here only example is enough that he had written almost thirty plays of full length and had staged those once or more than once at his risk here in Kolkata or in the suburbs. He had written poems in the early adulthood and had two or three printed books of verses. Therefore it becomes easily deducible how huge amount of physical and mental energy he had spent through these. Moreover how deep was his love for drama can be induced through the calculation that, there was a time when he had also acted in his plays. It could be said that, he was the very first in India to write successful psychodrama.

Moreover, in the history of the theatrical world of Bengali literature his name is remembered with respect. So it is inducible that, this wisdom, intelligence, experience, creativity, passion, mood etc., all these things of his getting integrally calculated used to surrender before the suggestion that he gave to the mental patients. These things are undoubtedly not a suitable character for being a model psychotherapist or psychiatrist.

Likewise it also can not be said that he was a very good teacher. A few of his students had to learn the treatment of mental illness from him like learning through audio at the master's house in old times. He had no manual or module of his own regarding this learning. He also has not left behind any writing. So we do not have anything to say even if somebody having learnt the work from him claims today that he only is the discoverer of this psychotherapy.

It can be said in a nutshell that, he had left behind almost nothing done in the matter of properly documenting the clinical research-work obtained through enormous hard work throughout his fifty years and in serially preparing this subject as a field of work. As a result the readers or the interested ones have to be satisfied with the extent of information about his works received from his students. I noticed that a queer indifference used to be active in him in this matter (Is that the classical Indian psyche?).

Whenever the topic of doing this type of research-work raised he used to say, "What would happen doing all these? Do they have any value?" But a huge portion of whatever he had registered of these issues lies in the field of Social Science and here also he would get recognition as a first-class sociologist of India.

However, he used to perform psychotherapy, if hypnotic suggestion therapy can be called psychotherapy. Dhirendranath's psychotherapy was akin to combined therapy, where he applied both psychotherapy and medicinal treatment. So at times thinking of the junior physicians he used to say regretfully that, the psychiatrists have so many excellent opportunities in that they can treat with medicines and yet apply psychotherapy. This opportunity is not available with the physicians of any other stream. Yet the psychiatrists fail to tap this opportunity.

Because a number of them are either ignorant or unwilling or disinterested or wants to avoid problems and so on about this subject. In comparison Dhirendranath used to think and even say verbally, "Nothing human is alien to me." On being asked questions such as, "Do you think it is possible for a single physician to write prescriptions and apply psychotherapy at the same time?" He used to answer instantly, "Why would that not be possible, if the physicists can perceive of the 'particle type' and the 'wave type' simultaneously, then why not we for the sake of the humans?" As a result it was noticed that he was ready to do whatever

was necessary for the alleviation of people's suffering. Of course it is quite an awe-inspiring job to know about a human being on the basis of socio-psycho-biology and he did not take it as an easy job at all.

Yet Dhirendranath was also not the one to avoid this subject; particularly being a student of Pavlovian socio-psychology he found it quite comfortable to do this work. That is on considering it would become evident that, the socio-economic and cultural surrounding of a person gets reflected within him. The contemporary politics, sociology, economy, values etc., everything getting algorithmed is reflected through this very person. Consequently that very person stands before us as the text book for judgement. Let me tell you another thing in this context.

Dhirendranath used to perform psychotherapy and according to his opinion the physicians themselves have to do or at least lead the job of psychotherapy. He used to say this repeatedly. The logic for this also was very easy for him. Since the responsibility of the patient's treatment lies in the hands of the physician who himself has to give the entire explanation in this matter, therefore the responsibility of psychotherapy would also remain in his hands.

Because irreparable damage could occur to the patient if he is given wrong suggestions. So in all the cases at the end of giving suggestions he used to say, "Did I say anything objectionable?" If the patients complained anything in this regard, he used to change that portion of the suggestion then and there.

In this regard he used to apply more logic and say that, anybody like a specialist-physician can do this job if treating only with medicines works. So there is no need of psychiatrists for this. Again if the treatment of mental diseases becomes possible only with the application of psychotherapy, in that case too there is no need of psychiatrists, the presence of only the clinical psychologist would do.

Therefore according to his opinion, which mental patient doesn't need medicines, only psychotherapy would do – the right of taking this decision too belongs to the psychiatrist only. So I can say with responsibility that, Dhirendranath is possibly the only psychiatrist seen by us who used to regularly perform psychotherapy and combined therapy for the patients. He was no less condemned for this.

Many of us did not know properly what Dhirendranath exactly used to do in the name of treating mental patients; but sadly nobody even for curiosity tried to know about this matter. On the contrary, they had bestowed upon different names such as 'quack', 'cheat' etc.. He had to hear such words regularly from the so-called famous psychiatrists of Kolkata and he had endured that. A very gentle recognition for him was that he was a 'behaviour therapist'. There were a number of reasons behind the making of such a situation and we have discussed them earlier. Here a few contextual words should be said about the subject of psychotherapy only.

The subject named psychotherapy began in the world with the work of the psychoanalytic theory. According to Freud's theory, there are different repressed contradictions in the unconscious of our mind which can not always properly and emotionally set free. Due to the presence of this deficiency in our personality, various forms of neurosis show up in us and in that case being able to do the job of the person's emotional letting out with sympathy can lessen the suffering or burden of that person's oppressed mind. Primarily psychotherapy was initiated depending on this.

Later on it was noticed that, different theories were being originated to explain the mind and accordingly different theories of psychotherapy were being developed. Added to this were different kinds of theories regarding the process of growth and development of the children. Gradually with the availability of medicines in the market, psychotherapy was compelled to integrally calculate them with its system, or else it would have no existence at all. But we

could repeatedly hear the appeal from the psychotherapists that – through menal diseases especially through neurosis different changes of the body's physical activities happen centrally and psychotherapy is a must for the alleviation of those changes or disorder.

This type of thoughts gained importance even in Dhirendranath's mind especially on reading the books of Pavlov's student Platanov and applying them in his psychiatry practice. Different questions are now being raised abroad about the trustworthiness of psychotherapy because there another institution is bearing its expenditure under the Health Care Delivery System of a patient. As a result in the professional life there, and endeavour of investigating whether any short, simple, time-saving, yet suitable or effective arrangement for psychotherapy can be made in lieu of the time-honoured and traditional psychotherapy is going on.

On getting into such a situation many of us are apprehending that, psychotherapy would possibly get cornered. Then its proper growth and development and training would undoubtedly get interrupted. Yet it was noticed that, there are numerous schools of psychotherapy abroad and as if new schools of the same are being established there everyday. Here the only investigatable issue becomes the personality and the very ability-of-impressing-others of the person who has established a new school. However we can rely on the fact that the growing demand in the people's mind would keep psychotherapy alive.

Because when a person gets distressed whatever endeavour we make to lessen his suffering, he would definitely feel, "What did I get?" without the warm association of human beings. As a result we want it or not, humans would be compelled to hold social science through psychotherapy in order to rescue humans from this situation. Incidentally it should be mentioned that, in 2000 Neuro-psychiatrist Eric Kendell alongwith two other scientists received the Nobel Prize. Keeping his theory in front of us today we are able to prove that, psychotherapy does work in our brain. **P A S**

## Role of Alienation

Dhirendranath Gangopadhyay

Perhaps we were the first to commence before the Bengali-speaking population the discussion about the 'alienation' of an individual and the collective.

It was not our intention here to determine the correct defination of 'alienation', or to extend a tricky series of arguments for ascertaining the theory of 'alienation'. I never feel enthused even in the disembodied form of alienation. As a psychiatrist I am acquainted with the agony and pain of separate human beings and with the yearning of their attitude to join. I have curiosity in the embodied form of alienation. The close acquaintance with diseases such as neurotic, psychotic, suicide etc. has provided inspiration to me in the study related to 'alienation'. Many of my patients are alienated from the family, from the society, from the species and from their own entity. Certainly the limit or depth of this alienation is not equal in all the cases.

The extent, depth and nature of alienation varies from person to person. This opinion may be criticized from different points of view. But it must be said that, we have not yet been able to know, whether alienation is a social malady or a normal opposition reaction of idealistic people of all classes against the morbid society. Have we today got the answer of the question which perturbed and agitated the young mind through the anti-establishment unrest of the students and the youth in our society almost fourteen years ago? I think the number of the readers anxious of the future of alienation has not decreased, it is increasing. However I also think that the days of philosophical discussion and disembodied thinking regarding alienation

are over. The word alienation today is not unknown, quite familiar and well-used and that's why it is perhaps not being properly used in all cases. The repeated manifestation of the naked and disembodied form of alienation has largely blurred the idea related to it.

The manner of the manifestation and evolution of alienation through multiple sub-nationality, religion and language is different and full of variety in our country.

The manner of manifestation of alienation in Kashmir, Gujrat and Tripura is different. The racial alienation coming from the alienation based on sub-nationality-language-territory alongwith religious separatism is capable of creating important passion. The manifestation of violence in places such as Meerut, Ayodhya, Tripura etc. has an intrinsic speciality.

Today alienation is embodied, naked and evident. Almost four decades ago famous writer Collin Wilson had analysed the characters of a few historically famed outsiders in his book *The Outsider*. From a decade after that, thoughtful writers such as Kamus, Sartre and so on had tried to understand the 'outsider' by focussing the light of their Existential Philosophy. Again from around that time itself as the English version of Marx's 'Paris Manuscripts' (1844) became easily available, we notice even very trivial individuals such as us to become zealous with the help of the formulae and theories of materialistic psychology over the analysis of the mentality of people shot off from the society.

At times the evolution of alienation occurs through revolution – many of us are unanimous in this matter. When the society and the state fail to meet biological and socio-cultural need of majority of the people, they want to become fugitive. They may take to asceticism or may want to build new society through an all-pervading revolution by shattering the society dedicated to the act of fulfilment of the self-interest of a few people. This endeavour was noticed in different ways during the post-Second World War period in the just-freed colonies. Most of these unplanned endeavours have failed to achieve the desired result; but have made many of us understand that voting rights for all and a democratic Constitution only can not free people.

Let alone the matter of a comprehensive development, the social system prevalent at present is not capable of meeting even the biological requirement of the common man. Though a portion of the young men and women dedicated to revolution is depressed and neurotic, the other portion has engaged themselves in the act of alleviating social superstition and forming new culture. The abolishment of alienation didn't occur in their case. These former revolutionaries and radical reformists are divided and separated in small groups. They are very much interested towards carefully nurturing and conserving their racial awareness and sense of revolution. Many of them are suffering from inter-alienation at their ignorance.

In poor and developing countries these people endeavouring for a comprehensive change are certainly engaged in the attempt of various socio-cultural development. Certainly they are getting some results also. But they themselves – in spite of maintaining theoretical differences of opinion – are in much fewer cases unitedly advancing for the mass-interest-keeping works which can be done with a collective endeavour. They have not only become alienated from the exploiting society and state but also from the people accomplishing identical purpose. Though the extent and depth are not taking the form of a visible conflict, at present alienation is growing silently. When race and scattered thoughts of self-interest become bigger than the principle, no constructive work can be done. To remain engaged in the endeavour of proving and maintainng the accurateness of the theoretical formulae of their own and of self-defence then becomes the most important work. The breakage not only remains confined within the groups of these social-workers and revolutionaries, but also spreads over their ideology-dependant cultural organizations and newspapers and magazines. These statements are applicable to those young men and women who are neither opportunists nor absorbed with the thought of be all and end all personal interest, nor are worshipper of commodities and comfort.

I consider these people as categorized under a higher class. But they don't think much over the alienation of this electronics-based technology-rich society. Again they have increased the social alienation having attempted to solve the problems of the present society (where the individual person with the application of ultra-modern technology today is more alienated from the commodities produced by himself) with conventional formulae. Their united power is capable of continuing struggle against the colonial mentality, religious bigotry and provincial separatism based on sub-nationality and language. In this struggle the indication of the path of forming new society would be obtained through circumbulation of the path of achieving success.

The roots of religion, rather I should say religious bigotry have infiltrated the fat-bones-marrow of the people. Religious notions, especially the 'rituals' have assured and helped along the path of progress in almost all the matters of existence such as the fear for the hostile natural environment, the uncertainty of collecting food, the attack of wild animals, the prevention of mournings and diseases etc., since the primitive racial life-style of the human beings to the last decade of this century. The impact of religion is probably much more stronger than any political doctrine. In this age of science some people have become free from this impact, most of the people are still blind with the illusion of the charming side of religion – about the divine power and the supernatural glory of it. Supernatural beliefs and the assurance from the religious gurus direct eighty percent people of our country at their ignorance.

Every pious individual feels not only proud but also safe by considering his own religion as the best religion. In order to alleviate the filth of religion the incarnations appear in every age and his followers make endeavours of all kinds to teach depraved religious rebels a lesson. The bottomline of all religions (to love human beings) has been forgotten, so battles happen among the hypocrites. The hypocrites declare jihad not only against other religions, but also against the depraved ones following their own religion (reformist). A single religion on getting broken, forms a few religious and conflicting groups. To say that alienation gets initiated due to the differences in religious opinions, is a back-dated statement. In the beginning this religion wanted to combine many a races for the advantage of the prevention of natural calamities, collection of food and self-defence. As a result the primary classification happened among the classes of the clergymen and that their clients.

Thereafter even alienation created the complex of hostility and is still doing so. But not as directly as before. The intention of all religions at present is to attain the honour of science or make arrangements for co-existence with it. The sense of religion and religious culture would still stay in the society, a change suitable for the age would occur in the commentaries and annotations of the religious scriptures. The words for the harmony of all religions and for a secular state would be uttered again and again, but religious conflict would also exist. *Swadharme Nidhanang Shreyah* - this idea I think would not change in the near future. Not even if a bourgeois revolution happens.

In countries where the waves of bourgeois revolution have not hit the shores, Renaissance and reformation have not taken place, a kind of devilishly powerful institution has been formed through the union of the colonial-feudal sense of religion and the democratic-political awareness. The members of this institution have been separated from the elementary theory and ethics of religion and these very people retain the power of staging a *Kurukshetra* again in the country one day loudly proclaiming the issue of fundamentalism.

Our nation is marked as secular in the Constitution. But it is practically a nation conserving all religions. Here one can raise the claim of parting away from the state by combining politics and communal interest. One may also take the advantage of Constitutional secularism in the presence of the weakness of God-fearing heads of the state.

Communal alienation is not allowing the sense of unity to grow up among the exploited mass of different communities. It is delaying and troubling the comprehensive change. It is indirectly going to establish the theory that – one man is the principal enemy of the other.

In the computer-centric production process the mutual relation and communication between the hearts of the labourers of the Nuclear Age is becoming weak and disembodied. It's true that lakhs and lakhs of people driven away by fear in the Nuclear Age are meeting together in processions, meetings and discussions; but the more production and defense, these two principal arrangements based on self-preservation and species-preservation, are becoming developed and mechanized, the more inter-human relation is becoming mechanical and cold; consequently the depth of the alienation is increasing.

The geographical boundaries between the countries are certainly becoming feeble, scientific mindedness and the dreadfulness of the Nuclear War is truly repelling the religious racial-lingual bigotry. But the deprived and receding race of human beings has become zealous for self-improvement and self-control through religious reforms, and formation of old traditions pertaining to the classes and sub-classes along with the formation of various cultural sub-groups dependant on languages and regions. They have a conflict continuing with the opportunist class resolved for maintaining a status quo. Man is the creator as well as the solution-provider against the unity of species of the possibility of a comprehensive combination. This belief is unshaken even in the Nuclear Age.

In spite of giving suitable respect to the culture dependant on the religion, language and region, we will be able to form new culture – a culture dependant on scientific humanity – to stir up this belief in our young men is the only way of preserving unity.

Written in July, 1974. **P A S**

## From the desk of Monochintak

The individual, whom we treat, lies down in pieces due to the dissection of analysis for the purpose of treatment. Every single ingredient of his mind is a unique piece. A separate analysis can go on with each single piece. The relation between every two pieces is also observed through dissection. After that when the individual passes over, or goes further and further after surpassing, the more he starts to associate with the flow of life, and with the society and the worldly affairs, the more he starts to gradually join with his rationality and irrationality and with his crisis and brightness. What lies behind as an inanimate substance is the single case. What goes forward is the story of an individual.

I can well remember that I was a student then. In the fresh intoxication of the subject I was spending all day and night in the hospital ward. On getting an interesting case I was sticking to it forgetting about eating and bathing. I was spending the whole day in the ward on getting such an obsessive compulsive disease (o.c.d.) case. His smile, walk, posture of sitting, his getting angry - everything was under the purview of our analysis. His egotism was being dissected in the machine of our analysis. I was checking up his fear, his doubt with the pages of the book. After having our tiffin in the tiffin-break we again started with the o.c.d. case. A hypothesis on the speciality of the structure of the limbs of the o.c.d.'s was found in some book. I was minutely observing the case's hands, legs and knees. Suddenly the senior nurse of the ward spoke up - Debashish has not yet eaten.

Who is Debashish! Oh yes! His name is Debashish! Suddenly Debashish woke up from inside the case. We forgot that he was Debashish. It did not come to our heads that he would feel hungry. Because he was that very case who had a fixation in the anal phase according to Freud's theory.

So, this time I wished to feel a few person's crisis with sympathy instead of analyzing

and solving the reason, movement and nature of the problem. Let us realize and put forth the whole of the human being. You would say, then where is the benefit of listening to mere stories. No, not at all! Do we reach a blurred position of the reason and solution of a problem, due to intense fellow-feeling while realizing the mental crisis of an individual with sympathy? If not, the cases would remain as cases, they could never become human beings.

1

A popular and influential teacher of a local high school Binoybabu came to the clinic and after shutting the door and putting the finger on his mouth said in an undertone – Doctor, kindly I will say in a very low voice, because I saw a student of mine sitting just outside. Thereafter whatever talking we did was in a low voice. The teacher wanted to know, the address of my clinic at the other place. He would go to the very place. I said, it is necessary that we break the stigma on the treatment of mental diseases. And your students could learn that lesson too from you. A mental crisis or ailment is not a matter of disgrace. They will also get to learn from you that it is rather a mark of personality to face this bravely with a scientific attitude. You and I, we all need psychiatric treatment. The students will learn to take this easily.

But the teacher informed with a timid solicitation – you see, the students in school greatly respect and obey me. I can not let the position of their dependance on me to spoil. How could I encourage them to fight and not to break down in case they come to know that I suffer from anxiety or depression? There are so many occasions I rebuke so many students, encourage them if they flee in the fear of examinations. I sufficiently censure the students who cry in fear before the examinations – Getting scared means accepting defeat, passing or failing is not the big deal, the main thing in life is only the fight, the courage of fighting is the true personality, not the number got in the examinations.

That very teacher has been defeated somewhere in life and is suffering from anxiety – this would be known to them and I will rule them, encourage them, become an inspiration and ideal to them – is that ever possible? I felt the people around me a little curious and inquisitive on seeing me coming here. In this area everybody recognizes me at a single call. I am in a position of great respect in the hearts of the people here. Please, in some other place you. ...

After listening to evrything when I ended writing the prescription, the teacher suddenly started talking very loudly – “O.K., then I will send him to you. I will send a hand-letter with him, please do check up him a little” – just saying this he instantly opened the door and disappeared with a lightning speed not looking to any other direction.

2

Aparajita's marriage has gone by for fifteen years. She is suffering from chronic depression for a few years. She has come with her husband Aniruddha. The basic reason of her depression is the philosophical pressure from her husband. Aniruddha reckons the mortal life of this world as a trivial toy. The great world of after-life, the invisible death – he reads about these things and argues. He goes to the meeting-place of the *Tantriks* to hobnob with them. Sometimes in the deep of night he closes the doors of the room to sit for worshipping. He tries to feel the icy coldness of the Space along the spinal cord with a thrilling sensation, being absorbed in meditation. He often goes to the cremation ground in the evening for an outing. At times he speaks up – *Ekameva Adwityam* and other times *Asato Ma Jyotirgamayah*.

Aparajita almost in tears spoke out – Do you know Doctor! Do you want to know which song he wanted me to sing for him at the night of the bridal bed? – *Marana Re Tuhu Mama Shyama Samaan*. All the night long he made me hear – There is no meaning of this life, this is only an illusion, it is not actually true. I said touching my own hand myself – you are telling that this me, as I am seeing myself, is not actually there! He said that no, there isn't. Whatever exists is only spiritual. The true life is nothing but spiritual. The body is a delusion. The real truth is the after-life. All night long I only thought – What an utter ruin, where have I arrived!

Do you know where he first took me for an outing after marriage? I looked at Aniruddha. He kept on smiling faintly in a wisely manner thinking Aparajita a novice. You will be startled to hear! He first took me to a cremation ground for an outing on a night of New Moon. He said that one has to come to cremation ground to know life. This trivial life ends and the spiritual after-life starts just from here. Here is that very door – saying this he picked up a laying piece of bone. I was a new bride, imagine my condition then! A few days later, I saw that he had brought a skull from where I don't know and said that it will remain all night long between the sleeping two of us. We will be able to realize the meaning of life deeply if we sleep, keeping death in between us. Because life and death exist back to back.

I inquired – Alright, this life is trivial, then how can it be back to back with the great and spiritual after-life? Aniruddha got a little embarrassed and after managing himself a bit said – The trivial this side has kept the great other side out of view.

Aparajita informed me that he used to apply force awfully in the beginning to sit with him for worshipping. But he has left doing so now.

Aniruddha said – Alright, you tell me Doctor, she is my better-half, won't I want her to become a companion in my religion! Tell me what substance do shopping, buying ornaments, going to movies, marketing etc. have in them? All these things are mortal, we would take nothing with us.

All the sources of life's joys have got withered and fallen one by one for Aparajita as a result of living with Aniruddha for a long time. Whatever remains is only an inhibitory depression. I was thinking about Aniruddha. Perhaps he has not found himself in this life due to the want of recognition since the childhood itself. Yet the analytical philosophical mind inside, has gradually stepped outside this life, to an imaginary after-life in order to find himself wishfully.

Or is that, an undercurrent of schizophrenia flowing through his family? Does that hereditary genetic load spread across his brain also? Because the tendency of mysticism concerning this type of after-life, spirits, super-natural, Tantrik, miracles etc. is often witnessed in a schizophrenic's family.

At the time of departure Aniruddha said – O.K. It's time for us to go, today we have disturbed you a lot. I said, 'The question of disturbing doesn't arise at all, because none of us does actually exist.'

Aparajita, in spite of being in depression, now for the first time laughed aloud to find herself inside another human being for the first time.

3

Little Mandira was brought by her mother. She looked at me with fearful round eyes. Although I drew her close to me, I saw that she was still looking at me with round eyes being as stiff as wood.

Her mother informed that she started crying at the very sight of English letters, English words, English numbers and English writings. She was saying repeatedly that she was scared. She was repeatedly laying aside that exercise book with her hands, looking at it and saying in tears – I Don't like it, I can not, I will not read English. She started crying embracing her mother and hiding her face in her mother's lap whenever she saw any English book.

What happened actually was that – little Mandira was admitted to a famous and well-ordered English medium school in Kolkata. Getting admission to such a school is considered to be a symbol of status. Naturally all the periods of the school are bound by neat and tidy discipline in order to build up the students to be very keen and methodical. Before the break-up of the school dazzling cars stand in rows. Most of the students here come by their own cars.

Absolutely middle-class parents of Mandira dreaming of their daughter speaking English fluently, have been able to get her admitted in this famous school after trying in a varied ways. It is prohibited to speak except in English within the boundaries of the school. Not only

speaking; smiling, crying, getting angry, everything is compulsory in English. One has to keep one's mother-tongue out of the school premises before coming in. The school has got this fame perhaps due to such strict discipline.

The classmate by the side, cautions with a 'shh' sound, putting his finger on the lips, if the pronunciation of somebody's mother-tongue spills out any moment. Punishment is inevitable if Miss hears it. On getting bitten by mosquitoes in the legs Mandira spontaneously spoke out in the classroom - *Ooh, ki mosh!* A great turmoil was made. Miss raised a hue and cry - What? Mosh! What is mosh! Speak in English or go to paathshala.

The methodical Miss of Calcutta chewed the word paathshala inside her mouth and mixed a little sneer with it to poke a little fun at the boorish paathshala. The Miss is of course herself a Bengalee; however being brought up under English medium school since her childhood, her mother-tongue has become jittery and her English has become like the blade of a spear, in spite of the fact that she has grown up eating the rice of the paddy that belongs to the field adjacent to that paathshala.

Mandira on finding no bounds of her thoughts about the English of 'Ooh ki mosh!' started crying and she was not to be stopped.

**Goutam Bandyopadhyay P A S**

" Objectivity cannot be equated with mental blankness, rather, objectivity resides in recognizing your preferences and then subjecting them to especially harsh scrutiny - and also in a willingness to revise or abandon your theories when the tests fail (as they usually do)." - S. J. Gould, "Capturing the Center", *Natural History*, **107**, (December, 1998): 18.

## Women and mental health

*For the non-specialist*

### BACKGROUND

In many under-served populations, women have considerable mental health needs. However, until recent years, the conception of women's mental health has been limited as have attempts to protect and promote it. When women's health issues have been addressed in these populations, activities have tended to focus on issues associated with reproduction - such as family planning and child-bearing - while women's mental health has been relatively neglected (WHO, 1993; WHO, 1995).

Women are integral to all aspects of society. However, the multiple roles that they fulfill in society render them at greater risk of experiencing mental problems than others in the community. Women bear the burden of responsibility associated with being wives, mothers and carers of others. Increasingly, women are becoming an essential part of the labour force and in one-quarter to one-third of households they are the prime source of income (WHO, 1995).

In addition to the many pressures placed on women, they must contend with significant gender discrimination and the associated factors of poverty, hunger, malnutrition and overwork. An extreme but common expression of gender inequality is sexual and domestic violence perpetrated against women. These forms of socio-cultural violence contribute to the high prevalence of mental problems experienced by women.

### SIGNIFICANT MENTAL DISORDERS AND PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY WOMEN

In investigating common mental, behavioural and social problems in the community we find that women are more likely than men to be adversely affected by specific mental disorders, the most common being: anxiety related disorders and depression; the effects of domestic violence; the effects of sexual violence; and escalating rates of substance use.

### MENTAL DISORDERS

Prevalence rates of depression and anxiety disorders as well as psychological distress are

higher for women than for men. These findings are consistent across a range of studies undertaken in different countries and settings (Desjarlais et al, 1995). In addition to the higher rates of depression and anxiety, women are much more likely to receive a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder, somatization disorder and panic disorder (Russo, 1990). In contrast men are more likely to receive a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and alcohol abuse/dependency. The gender differences associated with mental disorders are brought out most clearly in the case of depression (Russo, 1990). Data from the World Bank study revealed that depressive disorders accounted for close to 30% of the disability from neuropsychiatric disorders amongst women in developing countries but only 12.6% of the among men. The disparity in rates between men and women tend to be even more pronounced in underserved populations (World Bank, 1993).

### GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MENTAL DISORDERS

Explanations for the gender differences in mental disorders have been discussed in relation to different help-seeking behaviours of the sexes, biological differences, social causes and the different ways in which women and men acknowledge and deal with distress (Paykel, 1991). Blue et al, (1995) argue that while all these factors may contribute to higher rates of depression or psychological problems among women, social causes seem to be the most significant explanation. Women living in poor social and environmental circumstances with associated low education, low income and difficult family and marital relationships, are much more likely than other women to suffer from mental disorders. They conclude that the combined impact of gender and low socio-economic status are critical determinants of mental ill-health (Blue et al, 1995).

### PROMOTING WOMEN'S MENTAL HEALTH

It is essential to recognise how the socio-cultural, economic, legal, infrastructural and environmental factors that affect women's mental health are configured in each country or community setting. A gender-based, social model of health needs to be adopted to investigate critical determinants of women's mental health with the overall objective of contributing to improved, more effective promotion of women's mental health. Risk factors for mental disorder as well as for good mental health need to be addressed and where possible, a clear distinction should be made between the opportunities that exist for individual action and individual behaviour change and those that are dependent on factors outside the control of the individual woman.

To help clarify the meaning women themselves ascribe to mental health and various forms of psychological distress, findings from qualitative research need to augment those from quantitative research. Descriptions of life situations, case studies and direct quotes from women themselves can vivify the contexts in which emotional distress, depression, anxiety and other psychological disorders occur. Such first hand accounts of the experiences of poverty, inequality and violence will assist in developing a more accurate understanding of the structural barriers women face in attempting to exercise control over the determinants of their mental health and in effecting behavioural change. Both are needed to better inform the promotion of women's mental health.


Women's views and the meanings they attach to their experiences have to be heeded by researchers, health care providers and policy makers. Without them, research and the evidence it gathers, service delivery and policy formation, will be hampered in responding to women's identified health priorities, problems and needs. Moreover, all three will be ignorant of the nature and magnitude of unmet needs and unaware of the factors influencing women's utilisation of health care.

The identification and modification of the social factors that influence women's mental health holds out the possibility of primary prevention of certain mental disorders.

## SPECIAL SECTION

## Marxism and Psychoanalysis

Paul A. Baran



**MARXISM  
AND  
PSYCHOANALYSIS**

PAUL A. BARAN

**Comments :**

Dr. Aron Krich  
 Dr. N. S. Lehrman  
 Dr. Peter B. Neubauer  
 Dr. Norman Reider

**Reply :** Paul A. Baran**Appendix :**

The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis  
 By Dr. D. Fedotov

**Comment :** Dr. Norman Reider

[This special section is a reprint from *Monthly Review* magazine, October 1959 issue. Ed. PAS]

My topic tonight is one which by profession I am hardly qualified to discuss. I am an economist, and my concern with psychoanalysis is only marginal. If nevertheless I am going to speak about "Marxism and Psychoanalysis," it is because as a social scientist and as a Marxist I have to consider the social process as a whole; I have to study the phenomena which play a major role in the social life of our time. And it is a fact which we should face squarely: psychoanalysis today exercises an influence which is probably more pervasive than that of any other doctrine or school of thought which contributes to the formation of our "collective mind." It would be instructive to poll this large audience and to find out how many came here tonight because Marxism appears in the announcement and how many because of their interest in psychoanalysis.

Ever since Marxism stepped upon the intellectual stage as a powerful effort to understand historical development, its most important bourgeois adversary has been what I may call "psychologism." Although appearing in different forms, assuming different guises, and presented in different terms, psychologism has always rested on two main pillars: first, the reduction of the social process to the behavior of the individual; and second, the treatment of the individual as governed by psychic forces deriving their strength from instincts which are considered to be deeply imbedded in "human nature," with "human nature" in turn constituting an essentially stable, biotically determined structure.

Gradually, in the light of far-reaching changes in the real world and of accumulating historical and anthropological knowledge, these concepts became increasingly untenable, and traditional psychologism was forced into the background. What took its place is a new version psychologism : an amalgam of Freudian psychoanalysis and some quasi-Marxian, sociological notions - a doctrine which I propose to call "socio-psychologism." This new arrival on the ideological scene distinguishes itself from its defunct predecessor by recognizing freely that the individual is not entirely a man for himself but is influenced by society, is somehow affected by the social setting within which he grows up. What is crucial, however, is that society in socio-psychologism is viewed as "environment" : family, occupational stratum, inter-racial relations, residential community, and the like.

We must realize the implications of both positions. In the first, if it is "human nature" that determines the historical process, and if this "human nature" is unalterable, then all attempts to achieve a radical transformation of the human character and of the foundations of the social order are necessarily doomed to failure. In that case we might as well give up all hope for a society without exploitation of men by men, without injustice, without war, because all these things - exploitation, injustice, war - are the ineluctable result of the everlasting properties of the human animal. Encapsulated in his perennial "nature," man is eternally condemned to live down his original sin; he can never aspire to a free development in a society governed by humanism and reason. It hardly needs adding that what follows from these premises is a conservative or indeed a reactionary attitude towards all the burning issues of our time, an attitude close to the heart of the most "old-fashioned" elements of the ruling class.

Different conclusions emerge from socio-psychologism. For the proposition that human development is determined by the social "milieu" and depends on the nature of inter-personal

relations – on conditions obtaining with the family and so forth – leads obviously to the conclusion that significant changes (improvements) in human existence can be brought about by suitable “adjustments” in the prevailing environment. More togetherness and love, more schools and hospitals, and more co-ops and family counseling services then become the appropriate response to the human predicament in our society.

As in the case of all ideologies, neither psychologism nor socio-psychologism is a mere hallucination wholly unrelated to the real world. Each reflects, albeit in a distorted, ideological manner, an aspect of the actual, existential condition of men in capitalist society. By enunciating a manifest lie – the sovereign power of the individual in our society – psychologism points unmistakably to the loneliness, unrelatedness, and impotence of men under capitalism, and thus comes nearer truth than the shallow liberal claptrap treating “us” as controlling and shaping our lives, or pontificating about national or even international “communities” determining their own destinies. Similarly, in raising the principle *homo homini lupus* to the status of an eternal verity, in considering man to be by nature a selfish, aggressive monad fighting ruthlessly for a place in the market, psychologism captures more of the capitalist reality than those doctrines which would have us believe that the character of the capitalist man can be changed by sanctimonious incantations concerning love, productivity, and the brotherhood of man. For, with exploitation, injustice, and war having molded for centuries the character of men, treating the existing human species as a formidable rock not easily displaced or transformed is undoubtedly more appropriate than the view of the superficial meliorist who would reshape human attitudes by intensified preaching, by larger federal grants-in-aid to education, by strengthening the Pure Food and Drug Administration, or by electing a Democratic President.

Socio-psychologism, too, mirrors important aspects of our society. By uncovering the horrors of our culture – the dismal state of our educational system, the misery of our cities, the abominable “climate” in which Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and unemployed whites live in this country – socio-psychologism is nearer the realities of capitalism than the enthusiastic celebrators of free and unhampered private enterprise. At the same time, by attributing this social condition to “our” lack of enlightenment, to “our” incapacity for purposeful action, to the power of “conventional wisdom,” and to similar psychic “facts,” it expresses the refusal to see the fundamental causes of the existing malaise, a refusal that constitutes the characteristic and indeed decisive element of the ruling ideology. Moreover, the insistence of socio-psychologism on the curability of all of these ills by means of various and sundry “adjustments” is part and parcel of the spirit of manipulation in which the Big Business executive “fixes” the problems confronting his corporation by such methods as establishing recreation facilities for his workers, or appropriating more money for market research or advertising, or by initiating some fancy product variation. Thus socio-psychologism becomes one of the most important components – it not the most important component – of the ideology of monopoly capitalism which seeks to find ways of eliminating the most crying irrationalities, the most conspicuous injustices of the capitalist system in order to preserve and to strengthen its basic institutions.

But to realize and to unveil the ideological nature of both psychologism and socio-psychologism is only one part of what needs to be done. Even this job can be adequately performed only if the differences between the two doctrines are clearly understood, and if this ideological development is carefully analyzed as a reflection (and an aspect) of the transformation of the underlying economic, social, and political reality itself. Yet, as in the case of most problems posed by the emergence and evolution of monopoly capitalism, Marxism has been seriously remiss in coping with this matter. Failing to distinguish between old-fashioned psychologism and its modern, more sophisticated offshoot, Marxists, both in the West and in

the USSR, have been seeking to refute the latter by employing arguments applicable only to the former. This has been particularly tempting since marshalling the arguments called for little effort: all of them are readily available in the works of Marx and Engels, as well as in the writings of later Marxists.

Even more serious is that another, equally important part of the Marxist commitment has been left unattended to. This is the separation of the wheat from the chaff, the distillation of whatever genuine scientific insights may be submerged in the ideological flood of socio-psychologism. For to the development of Marxism nothing is more essential than the systematic identification and absorption of such scientific advances as are attained by bourgeois scholarship – accompanied by relentless unmasking and debunking of its manifold ideological ingredients.

Thus in dealing with psychoanalysis – a doctrine which is the mainstay of socio-psychologism and which differs significantly from earlier theories underlying psychologism – Marxists have taken the position that all of it is nothing but ideology void of scientific content. This attitude has been based to a large extent on the notion that Freud’s abiding concern with the irrational underpinnings of the conduct of men is tantamount to glorification of irrationality, to its elevation to the status of the ultimate, inexplicable, irreducible determinant of human activity. If such had been Freud’s view, there would be little indeed to distinguish him from all and sundry philosophers of romanticism and existentialism. Yet although Freud undoubtedly had strong tendencies in that direction – particularly apparent in some of his later writings – the bulk of his work is inspired by a different intention. Having recognized what is undisputable – that irrationality governs a large part of human behavior – Freud directed most of his life’s effort to an attempt at a *rational* understanding of irrational motivations. Far from considering irrationality to be an elemental phenomenon inaccessible to scientific analysis, Freud sought to develop a comprehensive theory providing a *rational* explanation of irrational drives.

To be sure, this ambitious goal remained beyond Freud’s reach. Nevertheless, he took the matter further than anyone before him, and – I might add – anyone after him, even if he did fail to arrive at a satisfactory concept of human conduct. And just as Marxism has been the heir and the guardian of what is most valuable and progressive in bourgeois culture, so it is incumbent upon Marxism today to take up Freud’s work where Freud left it, and to turn his insights to good use in the elaboration of a rational theory of human activity.

I submit that only Marxism is able to fulfill this task. For the Marxian theory of social dynamics sheds penetrating light on the factors principally determining human behavior. What is needed is to revive some of the central – albeit neglected – strands in Marxian thought, and to focus them on the problem at hand. While this claim of mine cannot be fully substantiated in a short lecture, I would like to attempt a “telegram-style” outline of the relevant considerations.

It is fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant “human nature.” With due regard for what can be considered biotic constants, the character of man is the product of the social order in which he is born, in which he grows up, and the air of which he inhales throughout his life; it is its result and indeed one of its most significant aspects. Yet it is of the utmost importance to understand that what is meant by “social order” in Marxian theory is at most only a distant cousin of the notion of “society” as employed in socio-psychologism. The latter, it will be recalled, refers to “environment”, to “inter-personal relations,” and to similar aspects of what constitutes the *surface* of social existence. The former, on the other hand, encompasses the attained stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, the form of social domination prevailing at any given time, all together constituting the *basic* structure of the

existing social organization. Changes of the social order (in the Marxian understanding of that term), radical and shattering as they always are, have taken centuries to mature and have occurred only a few times in the course of history. Correspondingly, changes in the nature of man have also proceeded at a glacial pace; while assuming tremendous proportions if looked at in full historical perspective, they have been all but imperceptible in the lifespan of entire generations. Still it is a fallacy to mistake the slowness of change in the character of man for its absence. This error leads to psychologism and to the belief in the everlasting sameness of the human species. And it is no less fallacious to deduce from the existence of change its rapidity. This error in turn leads to socio-psychologism and to the illusion that human beings can be "remodeled" by persuasion or by some repair jobs within the existing social order, that they can be manipulated into something different from what that social order has made them.

Thus a proper analysis of human motivations and conduct must refer to a timespan shorter than that of psychologism but longer than that of socio-psychologism. It has to avoid the a-historical frozenness of the former while escaping at the same time the newspaper-headline orientation of the latter. And it must consider human development in its true context: the economic and social order determining the content and molding the profile of the relevant historical epoch. Accordingly the exploration of the human character can neither rely on empty abstractions such as "man in general" nor gain much insight from an ever-so-careful examination of 'spurious concretes' such as the "other-directed personality," the "trade-union man," the "chamber of commerce man," or the "man in the gray flannel suit." At the present time and in this country, the object of the investigation is the human being born with certain inherited characteristics and reared as a member of a class in capitalist society or — more specifically — in capitalist society's most advanced stage, the reign of monopoly capital.

This suggests that — leaving biology aside — the first step of such an investigation has to be directed toward the understanding of the basic factors determining human existence under the prevailing social order. Outstanding among these factors is the vast expansion of society's productive resources. Based on a spectacular intensification of the subjugation of nature (including human nature) by society, this growth of productivity has promoted (and has been promoted by) a tremendous increase of rationality in the productive process as well as in the mental habits of men. Yet it is inherent in the capitalist order, and indeed its most striking characteristic, that this advance in rationality has proceeded in a complex and contradictory fashion. It has been primarily an advance of *partial* rationality and has remained essentially confined to segments of the social fabric, to its particular units and aspects. Thus the efficiency of industrial and agricultural enterprises, the rationality of their administration, of their cost and price and profit calculations, as well as of their efforts to manipulate the market, have reached unprecedented dimensions. But this increase in *partial* rationality has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth of total rationality, of rationality in the overall organization and functioning of society. In fact, the total rationality of the social order has declined; the disparity between *partial* and *total* rationality has been growing increasingly pronounced. This can be fully realized if one thinks of the contrast between the automated, electronically controlled factory and the economy as a whole with its millions of unemployed and other millions of uselessly employed people; if one considers the efficiency with which redundant chrome and fins are being affixed to unfunctional automobiles; or if one contemplates the palatial office towers, planned and equipped according to the last word of science, in which highly skilled employees devise the most effective methods for the promotion of a new soap, standing next to squalid slums in which families of five vegetate in one dilapidated filthy room. But the abyss dividing the parts from the whole is most horrifying if one places next to each other the breathtaking productive power harnessed in the energy of the atom, and

the death, the misery, the human degradation, that mark the existence of the great majority of mankind subsisting in the underdeveloped countries.

The basic reason for this glaring cleavage between partial and total rationality, between the rising "know how," and the declining "know what," is the alienation of man from his means of production, an alienation that has become increasingly marked throughout the history of capitalism and is strongly marked throughout the history of capitalism and is strongly accentuated in its current monopolistic phase. Indeed the concentration of the means of production in the hands of a small group of oligarchs — responsible to no one but themselves and to their everlasting commitment to keep increasing their profits — who smoothly and rationally preside over their corporate empires, has completed the fixation of the productive apparatus as a power outside and above the individual, a power dominating his existence but entirely inaccessible to his control. And at no time in history has this power over the vast and growing productive forces been to such an extent power over life and death of millions of men, women, and children everywhere.

But the most insidious, and at the same time the most protentious, aspect of this overwhelming power of the objectified productive relations over the life of the individual is their capacity to determine decisively his psychic structure. For the conflict between total and partial rationality not only sets the tone of the entire capitalist culture; it also sinks deeply into the mentality of the human being brought up in and molded by the all-pervasive institutions, values, and habits of thought which make up that culture. The exigencies of the productive process call for the development of an increasingly well trained, literate, and intelligent manpower. Earning a livelihood at the conveyer belt, in the office, or in the sales force of the modern corporation depends on the possession of rational attitudes and aptitudes greatly superior to what was required at an earlier, less advanced stage of capitalist development. Much of the work that used to be guided by authority, tradition, and intuition is now based on scientifically established procedures and accurate measurements. Yet, as stressed above, this highly rationalized effort is directed towards largely irrational ends; the individual worker is not only unconcerned with the outcome of the productive process in which he plays an infinitesimal part but this outcome has no meaning and no purpose; it cannot inform his activity with the knowledge of aim or with the pride of accomplishment.

This incessantly reproduced clash between what might be called "micro-sense" and "macro-madness" is, however, only one part of the story. The other, even more important, aspect is the profound impact of the lack of total rationality upon the dynamics and nature of partial rationality itself. I must therefore amend what I said above about the achievements in regard to partial rationality. For reason is indivisible, and the rationality of the whole cannot coexist harmoniously with the rationality of the parts. The one continually threatens the other, and their antagonism expresses one of the profound contradictions of the capitalist system. Whereas the irrationality of the whole must be constantly maintained if exploitation, waste, and privilege, if — in one word — capitalism is to survive, the rationality of society's individual parts is enforced by the drive for profits and the competitive necessities of capitalist enterprise. Thus this partial rationality continually edges forward — albeit jerkily and unevenly — but the advance takes place at the cost of its being warped, perverted, and corrupted by the irrationality of the surrounding social order. As a result, such progress as has been attained is far from uniform. Some of it constitutes genuine steps forward in the rational comprehension of the world and in the development of the forces of production. This applies to much of what has been accomplished in such areas as mathematics and natural sciences, as well as in certain branches of historical research. Elsewhere, however, what parades as an increase in rationality is frequently nothing but the amplification and propagation of business "know how,"

of the rationality of the capitalist market. There the intellectual effort which takes market relations for granted is exclusively directed towards manipulation in the interest of corporate enterprise. What it promotes is "practical intelligence," the capacity to make the best of a given market constellation, to maximize one's advantages in the struggle of all against all. Thus, important parts of physics and chemistry have been pressed into the service of war and destruction; much mathematical and statistical ingenuity has been turned into an auxiliary of monopolistic market control and profit maximization; psychology has become a prostitute of "motivation research" and personnel management; biology is made into a handmaiden of pharmaceutical rackets; and art, language, color, and sound have been degraded into instrumentalities of advertising.

Under such circumstances human rationality inevitably becomes crippled, and its advance is pushed into a direction that bears no relation to the prerequisites for, and the needs of, human health, happiness, and development. If the compulsion to take *anything* for granted is a fetter on the expansion and perfection of men's capacity to reason and to understand, the oppressive and stifling function of that fetter grows in proportion to the irrationality of what men are brought up not to question but to accept as a datum. True, taking capitalism for granted when it was an essentially progressive social order interfered relatively little with (or even promoted) the development of partial rationality. By the same token, however, the necessity not to scrutinize but to treat as part of the natural order of things the regime of monopoly capital, along with all the waste and all the destruction that go with it, constitutes a straitjacket within which reason cannot but suffocate. Thus the clash between partial and total rationality becomes complicated and aggravated by the no less violent conflict between reason and the debasement of reason which dominates the sphere of partial rationality itself.

This condition has manifold psychological ramifications to only two of which I can now attempt to draw your attention. First, such rationality as prevails solidifies itself into a system of rules, procedures, and habits of thought that not only does not further the satisfaction of human needs but becomes a formidable obstacle to human development and, indeed, survival. As bourgeois rationality turns increasingly into the rationality of domination, exploitation, and war, the ordinary man revolts against this obstruction to his aspirations for peace, happiness, and freedom. Yet, afflicted with "common sense" that is studiously nurtured by all the agencies of bourgeois culture and the principal injunction of which is to take capitalist rationality for granted, he can hardly avoid identifying the rationality of buying, selling, and profit-making with reason itself. His revolt against capitalist rationality, against the rationality of markets and profits, thus becomes a revolt against reason itself, turns into anti-intellectualism, and promotes aggressiveness toward those who manage to capitalize on the rules of the capitalist game to their advantage and advancement. It renders him an easy prey of irrationality.

Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time are, therefore, not emanations of some unalterable human instincts. Nor do they express simply the supposedly "natural" rejection of *reason*. Irrationality and aggressiveness in our time reflect primarily the refusal to accept as sacrosanct the rationality of capitalism. They testify to the protest against the mutilation and degradation of reason for the sake of capitalist domination. This outcry against bourgeois rationality, as well as its identification with reason as such, is magnificently depicted in Dostoevsky's 'Underground Man' who "vomits up reason" and who scornfully rejects the commandment to accept the proposition that two times two equals four. While this strikingly exemplifies the posture of irrationalism, an important aspect of the Underground Man's attitude should not be lost sight of. It is that the Underground Man, irrational and "crazy" as he is, is actually profoundly *right* in "vomiting up reason," in refusing to bow to the logic of two times two equals four. For this logic is the logic of the capitalist market, of the exploitation of man

by man, of privileges, insecurity, and war. To be sure, his contempt for *this* rationality, his uprising against the "common sense" of human misery, is an irrational reaction to a pernicious social order. But it is the only reaction available to the isolated and helpless individual who, incapable of comprehending the forces by which he is being crushed, is unable to struggle effectively against them. This reaction is neurosis.

Secondly, as I mentioned in passing earlier, the development of the forces of production and the advance of rationality with which it has been associated were based on a tremendous intensification of human domination over nature. The result of this harnessing of natural resources to the needs of men has been a momentous rise in the output of goods, services, health, and literacy – combined with a spectacular lightening of the burden of human toil. Yet this advance was achieved not merely by the expansion of human control over the objects and energies of the outside world; it was based on a perhaps even more radical subjugation of the nature of man himself. This subjugation has two separate, if closely interconnected, aspects. In the pre-capitalist era, it involved the emergence and development of the domination and exploitation of man by man. Extracting from the underlying population varying quantities of economic surplus, the dominating and exploiting classes used this economic surplus to assure their privileged positions in society, at the same time directing larger or smaller shares of the surplus to investment in productive facilities or to the maintenance of military, religious, and cultural establishments. Applied to those days, however, the expression "surplus" is a euphemism. With productivity and output rising only very slowly, the condition had not yet been attained in which the consumption of the ruling class and its outlays on productive investment and on religious and military and other purposes could be based upon a genuine sufficiency of goods and services for the people. Sheer violence and elaborate systems of political enforcement always played a major role in the process of extraction of the requisite resources. Yet neither would have been able to fulfill this task had it not been for the development and propagation of religious, legal, moral – in one word: ideological – notions which sanctified the ruling classes' claims to their appropriations and which were turned in the course of centuries into a comprehensive network of internalized thoughts, beliefs, fears, and hopes, compelling the people to recognize the rights and to heed the demands of their rulers.

A new chapter was opened by the advent of the capitalist order. Now the human being had to go through a further process of "adjustment." To the qualities cultivated in the wood-hewers and water-carriers of old had to be added a new and all-important characteristic, that of rationality. For now it was no longer sufficient to be an obedient and selfless serf of a cruel and rapacious squire; what was required henceforth was a diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker in a rationalized, streamlined, profit-maximizing capitalist enterprise. This enforced what is probably one of the most far-reaching transformations of "human nature" experienced thus far. If in the course of preceding history man had been made submissive by exploitation and domination, the working principles of the capitalist order demanded that he should acquire the ability to calculate and the habit of acting with forethought and deliberation. What was left of his elemental emotionality, of his spontaneity, after having been disciplined for centuries by the whip of his titled overlords, came now under the much more systematic, much more comprehensive pressure of the callously and accurately calculating market.

As deliberateness in the business of earning a living – and in all other aspects of life as well – became the prerequisite for survival in capitalist society, spontaneity came to be disdained and feared not only as a source of disruption of the production routine but as a threat to the stability of the class-dominated and exploitative social order. From the very beginning of the capitalist era it was accordingly exposed to a withering fire of economic sanctions and social opprobrium, and the assault against it was mounted simultaneously by the entire

apparatus of bourgeois ideology and culture, including such divergent components as Christian religion and the utilitarian philosophy. And in capitalism's current, monopolistic, phase this attack has multiplied in scope and intensity. Just as human relations in corporate empires came by necessity to be attuned to "making friends and influencing people," so has love been "streamlined" into a scientifically approved means of securing medically indicated sexual gratification, while beauty is identified with the precise measurements of Miss America, and nature, music, literature, and art are valued in exact proportion to their serving as purveyors of "relaxation." Not that the campaign against spontaneity was ever decided upon or directed by some executive committee of capitalist elders, although attributing to Marxism such a view of the matter has long been the stock in trade of professional Marx-refuters whose ignorance of Marxism is exceeded only by their incapacity to understand it. The implacable hostility toward spontaneity and the powerful tendency toward its suppression are rather the inherent characteristics of a mode of production based on commodity exchange and unfolding within a system of relations of production of domination and exploitation. Far from being a premeditated, well-planned stratagem of the ruling class, calculated to repress the drives and aspirations of the underlying population, both the ascent of deliberateness and the decay of spontaneity affected the members of the ruling class itself and turned them in the course of time into unhappy beneficiaries of an unhappy society.

The crux of the matter, it seems to me, is that market-oriented deliberateness and market-induced suppression of spontaneity, "adjusting" the privileged and the underprivileged alike to the requirements of the capitalist system, fatally damage what Freud, and before him Marx and Engels, identified as the sources of human happiness: freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. Putting a severe tabu on the individual's emotionality and channeling what is left of it into an aggressiveness which is disciplined and directed toward the attainment of success and the elimination of rivals in the competitive struggle, they produce "affect-crippledness" — to use an expression of Freud — and generate the phenomenon which was put into its proper theoretical context by Marx in his concept of the alienation of man from himself. This alienation of man from himself — the maiming of the individual, the subjugation of his nature to the needs of capitalist enterprise, the mortal wounding of his spontaneity, and the molding of his personality into a self-seeking, deliberate, calculating, and circumspect participant in (and object of) the capitalist process — represents the basic framework within which the psychic condition of men evolves in capitalist society.

It is only within this framework that I can see a promise of a genuine understanding of psychic disturbances in our time. As I mentioned earlier, achieving such an understanding was not given to psychoanalysis. To be sure, Freud's identification of sexual malfunctioning as the principal source of psychic disorder represented a major advance in psychological thought. But what Freud's theoretical structure fails to provide — all assurances and appearances to the contrary notwithstanding — is a satisfactory explanation of the sexual malfunctioning itself. Not that Freud was unaware of this weakness of his doctrine, but it was in attempting to fill this crucially important gap that his efforts were least successful. It was here that he sought to find refuge either in psychologism or in socio-psychologism: either in a concept of a biologically unchanging human nature with equally unchanging intra-family relations as symbolized in the ancient Oedipus legend; or in surface observations referring to habits of child rearing and of sexual enlightenment. Neither of these approaches enabled him to solve the central issue confronting psychology at the present time: the specification of the part played by more or less invariant biological factors in the determination of the psychic structure of men, and the analysis of the profound impact upon the human psyche exercised by the alienation of man from himself in the society of monopoly capitalism.

Marxists, impressed by the momentous accomplishments of Pavlov and his school, have focused attention on the former aspect of the matter and have tended — paradoxically enough — to sidestep Marx's revolutionary contribution to psychology: the sociology of the psyche. Still, while there can be no dispute about the importance of physiological factors in governing human behavior, it is indispensable to recognize the vast extent to which the economic and social order of capitalism and the process of alienation which it generates mold the psychic and, indeed, the physical functioning of men in the capitalist era. For it is impossible to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from the capitalism-caused atrophy of spontaneity; it is impossible to understand the shrinking capacity to experience sensual gratifications of any kind apart from the capitalism-generated proliferation of deliberateness, selfishness, and aggressiveness. I would go further and say that it is impossible to comprehend human activity in our society except as an outcome of a dialectic interaction of biotic forces and the working principles of monopoly capitalism, with the latter dominating, subjugating, and directing the former. And it is crucially important to recognize the nature of this interaction of the determinants of human existence under capitalism, because it is the powerful dynamism of the social and economic order which points to the location of the strategic leverage which in fullness of time will shift the historical gears and orient the development of man towards a fuller realization of his physical, emotional, and rational capacities. This leverage is to be found neither in tranquilizing pills nor in "social adjustments," nor in the preaching of love, of productivity, and of "meeting of minds." This leverage must be found in the establishment of a more rational, more human society, and conversely in the abolition of a social order based upon the domination and exploitation of man by man. Not that socialism would change the situation "overnight." Expecting the liquidation of the centuries-old legacy of capitalism within a relatively short — if ever so eventful — period of transition reflects the attitude of socio-psychologism, which is as fallacious in this case as it is in others. Thus it is by no means an accident that those who hold the views of socio-psychologism are among the severest critics of the existing socialist societies: censuring sharply the Soviet Union or even China for not having yet abolished the alienation of man, and for not having yet created the socialist individual. It hardly needs stressing that demanding such impossible changes amounts to demanding no changes at all; that stipulating the immediate realization of what can develop only slowly on the basis of vast institutional transformations as a condition for the participation in the struggle for a better society is tantamount to deserting this struggle altogether.

A few concluding remarks: What I have said so far is not meant to suggest that there may be no possibility of individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psychiatric treatment. The frequently reiterated observation that the degree of success attained in psychotherapy is largely independent of the school of psychological thought to which the therapist adheres, but is rather determined by the skill and personality of the physician and the amount of attention given by him to the patient, suggests the absence of any well-founded theory underlying psychotherapeutic practice. Moreover, psychotherapy's relative success in dealing with isolated symptoms of nervous disorder and the generally admitted failure of its efforts at curing character neurosis would tend to confirm the earlier expressed view that the phenomena underlying character neurosis are inaccessible to treatment on the individual plane. Indeed, the insistence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual plane, of "producing" a healthy, well-functioning, and happy individual in our society is in itself an ideology. It tears asunder individual and society, it ignores the alienation of man under capitalism, and it represents a capitulation to socio-psychologism. It obscures the painful but ineluctable truth that the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of the society in which he lives. **P A S**

## Beyond Psychology

Aron Krich

Paul A. Baran's paper "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" calls attention again to the danger of a jealously guarded and partisan monism. Faced with the formidable task of synthesizing two seminal conceptualizations of man in society, Professor Baran atomizes psychoanalysis by extrapolating a theory of personality out of a theory of history. The result, of course, is not synthesis but an ideological fantasy in which *depth* psychology (my italics) is held to concern itself with "what constitutes the *surface* of social existence" (Baran's italics), and in which abstractions like "the attained stage of the development of productive forces" are held to be of more concrete influence on the individual than mother love. Corollary contradictions arise in embracing those theories of psychoanalysis least reconcilable with Marxism while castigating its complementary aspects.

This last point best illustrates Baran's need to deny those developments in contemporary psychology and psychoanalysis which threaten his imposed "hegemony" of Marxism. Readers will recall that Baran, in renouncing "socio-psychologism" as amelioristic, suggests that "only Marxism is able to fulfill the task" of "taking up Freud's work where Freud left it." Baran then goes on to say that it is "fundamental to the Marxian approach to the study of man that there is no such thing as an eternal, invariant human nature." But Freud never abandoned his belief that the infant comes into the world with an archaic phylogenetic inheritance which is active in its mental life. These built-in memory traces, Freud held, gave impetus, for example, to fears of castration as punishment for incest wishes.

It follows that for Freud "the fate of the Oedipus Complex" is the crucial determinant of personality in any society, no matter how advanced or primitive. This has remained a basic, if sometimes hidden, postulate of the orthodox Freudian school. Its rejection accounts, along with other differences too technical to outline here, for the rise of the so-called culturalist school of psychoanalysis, which Baran refers to as "socio-psychologism" and which believes — along with Baran — that "man is the product of the social order in which he is born." Yet it is just at this point in his paper that Baran decries their interest in society as referring "to environment, to inter-personal relations, and to similar aspects of what constitutes the *surface* of social existence."

Baran achieves these stunning reversals by a device which is not immediately apparent in the text of a persuasive polemic. As I read it, I found myself puzzled at being in disagreement even while wanting to agree, until I realized that he was writing about a psychoanalysis stripped of function. The work of metapsychology is taken over by a "metamarxism." Nowhere in the paper is there a recognition of psychoanalysis as an instrument for the exploration of the inner processes of human personality. By the same token there is utter disregard, or ignorance, of its clinical observations.

How else could we explain Baran's dismissal of the need for love as "liberal claptrap." The most convincing kind of evidence (Spitz, Coldfarb, Roudenko, Bowlby and others) is now available that the absence of mothering care in the first year of life can lead to crippling disabilities of personality, ranging from psychopathic inability to give and receive love to mute autism. More recently these findings have been confirmed in the controlled laboratory setting by Harlow's now famous, ingenious substitution of wire and terry-cloth "mothers" for the real mothers of infant rhesus monkeys. Baran either is — or pretends to be — oblivious of that part of human motivation which is elaborated below the level of awareness in the constellation of

nurture and nature.

By eliminating the psychic backdrop against which human events are enacted, Baran leaves himself without a set of variables intervening between the individual and his social order. Since, according to Baran, the important influences on human beings do not stem from "environment" (i.e., the encounters from birth through maturity with parents, peers, and other significant people who transmit and interpret the social order) but from the social order itself, (i.e., "the attained stage of the development of productive forces, the mode and relations of production, the form of social domination prevailing") the reaction of the individual becomes undifferentiated. Neurosis, in Baran's sense of the word, identifies something endemic to the sick society and, in the analogue of physical disease, the individual unavoidably "catches" it as from a non-filterable virus.

Indeed, in his spoken remarks Baran declared: "Neurosis is society." Strangely enough this position, if modified to read, "Change society and man's difficulties in living will change," is central to much of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, in particular, have alerted us to the possibilities of a double neurosis in which the pressures of cultural history herniate into the vicissitudes of personal history. The position that man is a product of his culture as much as his culture is a product of man is the basis for those occasional recommendations for new ways in child-rearing, education, and other human relations emanating from the movement of "socio-psychologism" which Baran considers so pusillanimous.

Obviously some of us are more immune than others from infection by our sick society. There is a growing body of studies on the epidemiology of mental illness which may ultimately reveal a nosological pattern of mental disorder by economic class, occupation, education, or other reality circumstances. However, all of us live under monopoly capitalism; but only about 15 percent of us break down under its pressure or are seized with its "macro-madness". The rest of us hang on to our culture's "micro-sense." We handle the stress of life in a variety of ways with varying degrees of success or failure. The methods we choose to use come up for examination in the psychoanalytic therapies. From these we learn that the adult who is having neurotic difficulties in living is usually suffering from an inability to let go of beliefs about himself and his world which were early imprinted and are no longer appropriate. Such an individual is not in the trip of "the form of social domination prevailing" but is, rather, in the toils of what Freud once called his "reminiscences" of what happened in his past.

To see the operational inutility of Baran's reductionism we need only look at actual clinical situations. "It is impossible," Baran writes, "to understand sexual malfunctioning apart from capitalism caused atrophy of spontaneity." Parenthetically, one might ask Baran to document his assumption that sexual malfunctioning has increased in the advanced stage of monopoly capitalism over, let us say, late 19-century burgeoning industrialism. From the sparse evidence available it seems more likely that at least one half of the population in the countries of greatest industrial development are enjoying greater sexual participation and response than ever before. But, again, Baran's reductionism leaves no leeway for the consideration of such variables as the accelerating emancipation of women.

Leaving this question aside, we could reply to Baran that it is *quite possible* to understand and treat sexual malfunctioning without reference to "capitalism-caused atrophy of spontaneity." Any clinician could supply numerous instances of the removal of debilitating symptoms and disturbances in the sex-life without such reference. At the risk of sounding gauche in this non-clinical publication, I must say that understanding a patient's masturbation fantasies may be more pertinent. In the area of sexual behavior, Marxism has rather remote heuristic value when compared to the methodology of psychoanalysis.

However, if Baran intends his sweeping statement to mean that behavioral science must

be broad enough to include all the data which might help us to understand the individual, then he is doing contemporary psychoanalysis an injustice. On the whole, today's therapists are alert to the multiple vectors that locate the individual in his social field. As a corrective to Baran's caricature of psychology as the "prostitute of motivation research," I offer a randomly chosen sample of a psychoanalytic view of the "economic" factors in neurosis. From a recently published statement by a spokesman for the Karen Horney group we hear:

As originally pointed out, in spite of individual variations, the crucial conflicts around which neuroses develop are almost always the same. It is economically based in our culture on the principle of individual competition which generates hostilities and fears. Success means economic security and enhanced prestige; failure, less income and diminished self-esteem. With the resultant emotional isolation, the need for love becomes all the more intense and is over-valued in our culture. This — not genuine love, but an illusion of it — will solve all problems. Just as there are contradictory drives in neurosis, there are false values in our culture which intensify the neurotics' problems. We put value on competition and success with which antithetical values of brotherly love and humility collide. Simultaneously, desires for more are stimulated through our advertising, while circumstances constantly frustrate them. We are told we are free individuals, although realistically there are many factual limitations to getting what one wants even if one is energetic and efficient. (Kellman, *American Handbook of Psychiatry*, p. 1437)

This point of view is not unique in psychoanalytic circles, even being held to some extent by Freudians who are theoretically bounded by the libido theory. It is axiomatic in the major schools of psychoanalytic thought that in every neurosis there is some element of "reaction to society." If the individual encountered no external obstacles to his wishes he would have no need for the special life arrangements we call neurosis. Indeed, the ego itself would have no cause to develop beyond the blissful hallucinations of infantile omnipotence. But societal existence makes demands for mastery as well as adjustment. How the individual handles these transactions with reality is the subject matter of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a method of treatment of the abnormal personality out of which has grown a body of hypotheses concerning normal personality. Its theories are largely based on clinical empiricism. Some have been verified in the long pull of experience; some are still in the process of verification by observation and experiment; others have been, or will be, discarded as new insights make them obsolete. This readiness to correct itself keeps psychoanalysis from becoming a closed system. It protects psychoanalysis from declaring, as Baran does for Marxism, that *only* psychoanalysis can see the full spectrum of man's existence.

I have heard no less a pioneer psychoanalyst than Theodor Reik declare that by the year 2000 psychoanalysis as we know it today will cease to exist. For the goals of psychoanalysis are functional and relative, aimed mainly at liberating from confining symptoms the inherent potential of the individual to deal purposefully with his complex intimate and public environment. I see nothing here which is inimical to social change. On the contrary, by making it possible for the individual to discern and engage the genuine enemies of his will-being it adds a new dimension to his citizenship in the world.

It seems to me that Baran's failure to grasp the significance of early life experience for the emotional and mental "set" of the adult individual leads him into distortions not only of the psychoanalytic investigation of environment but also of a position implicit in Marxism itself. Marxism, by calling attention to the ways in which the cultural superstructure erected upon an economic base, proliferates social organizations and arts and sciences which attempt to singularize or pedestalize it, is an eminently environmental theory. In attacking the concept of "environment" in a polarity between psychologism and socio-psychologism, Baran leaves us in an epistemological dilemma. If changes in environment are futile, then human nature is

immutable. If human nature is immutable then changes in environment are futile.

Professor Baran attempts to escape this dilemma by positing a "sociology of the psyche". This means, I suppose, that individual psychology is held indeterminate between epochal social changes like that of feudalism to capitalism and, again, in the projected leap from capitalism to socialism. What happens to human motivation in the interval is rejected as spuriously concrete and ahistorical "socio-psychologism." In this paradigm of wishful thinking, psychology is by-passed and with it the possibility for genuine understanding of how the nature of man changes while he changes his society. **P A S**

## The Conflict within Psychoanalysis

N.S. Lehrman. M.D.

Professor Baran's distinguished paper on "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" in the October issue of *Monthly Review*, is a welcome advance in Marxist thinking. It points out the fundamental difference in approach between Freud and Marx, rather than prating about non-existent differences between Freud and Pavlov. The basic truth which Baran points out most clearly once again is the fundamental fact that Marx's sociological explanations of psychology are far more accurate and far more useful than Freud's biopsychological explanations of sociology.

Having made this point, however, Baran does not slip and throw the Freudian baby out with the bathwater. He recognizes the importance, as many Marxists have not, of separating that which is true and useful in Freud's work from its mystical, unscientific core. To follow Baran still further, I think we must do with Freud what Marx did with the mystical Hegel; not discard him but, in a sense, stand him on his feet. I believe this task is in process of being accomplished.

The key to this problem, as I see it, is the scientific recognition and understanding of the importance of human feelings as *signals*. Pavlovians have recognized the importance of verbal signals, but have tended to minimize the significance of emotions. Freudians, correctly recognizing the importance of human feelings, have incorrectly seen them as determined ultimately by inner biological reality rather than by outer social reality. A correct synthesis of the two points of view is by no means impossible.

### Three Specific Criticisms

There are three aspects of Baran's paper, however, to which I believe valid exception can be taken.

(1) While I think he is correct in criticizing "socio-psychologism", it seems to me that he does not sufficiently recognize the correct direction this movement *has* taken, even though it has as yet not gone far enough. To present "socio-psychologism" solely as a "concession" is incorrectly to imply that there is a mastermind within the field of psychoanalysis from whom scientific advance is reluctantly extracted. I do not think there is any such mastermind, although perhaps some psychoanalyst members of the Guild of Catholic Psychiatrists might like to take on this function.

Because "mental health" has so far been presented only in terms of family and other soupy "togetherness" does not mean that the concept can go no further. True mental health can only be achieved under socialism, in which man's exploitation of man, and man's consequent inhumanity to man, have been ended.

(2) Baran's discussion of man's "alienation from himself" also has a rather vague and

fuzzy flavor. I am not quite sure what he means – and this is unusual in so precise and meticulous a thinker as Baran. Perhaps he is referring to the ever-widening gap between the *actual* achievements of the individuals in our society and their ever-increasing potentials. If so, greater precision in his paper might have been in order.

(3) Baran seems to overstress the importance of spontaneity and emotionality in his basically correct criticism of the “men of measured merriment” of our times. This overstress can lead to a worship of impulse and feelings, at the expense of thought and consciousness. Freudians have attempted, in the most unscientific way possible, to separate thinking from feeling, and it is a little surprising to find Baran apparently tending to do the same. Thought and feeling are two aspects of the same process; Sir Charles Sherrington, the brilliant British Nobel laureate in neurophysiology, pointed out long ago that “every cognition has, potentially at least, an emotive value.” This inextricability of thinking and feeling is most clearly described in V.J. McGill’s fine little book, *Emotions and Reason*.

#### **What Psychoanalysis Can Do**

Unlike Baran, I write as a professional in the field of psychoanalysis. In my opinion, psychoanalysis is one of the most potent tools that have existed in the medico-ideological armamentarium. Provided that a person’s basic economic needs are met – and they usually are in the people who can afford the treatment – psychoanalysis can often truly throw open the door of happiness and usefulness to suffering people. It can do so by giving them a clearer understanding of themselves in relationship to the world about them – to their families and to their society – by helping them to understand and to change their own incorrect responses. It can do so by helping people to understand their own feelings, the signals to their consciousness arising from their present and past experience, and by aiding them to understand the extent to which these feeling-signals are accurate, and to what extent they are not.

I have seen desperate, panicked people returned to usefulness, health, and courage through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen disintegrating families, filled with acrimony, restored to warmth, happiness, and effectiveness through psychoanalytic treatment. I have seen cowardly people become courageous, and terrified people become calm, again through psychoanalytic treatment. Properly applied, by a courageous psychoanalyst with an accurate perception of the world in which he lives, psychoanalysis can, even at this moment, after certain important technical changes, be a most mighty boon to many of the suffering Americans who can afford it.

The effectiveness of psychoanalysis is, however, limited by the society within which it exists. The extent to which any person can be helped cannot, in the long run, extend beyond limits set by the contradictions and opportunities of the society he lives in. But, on the basis of what I have seen, I firmly believe that psychoanalysis can help people to see reality more clearly, so that they can help to improve the world, and even to enjoy it in the process.

#### **What Psychoanalysis Has Done**

The potentialities of psychoanalysis for assisting human advancement are tremendous. So are the potentialities of nuclear energy. In both cases, I am referring to what might be done with the valuable ideas, techniques, and ideology, after elimination of the anti-human and unscientific elements.

But the overall result of psychoanalysis, like that of nuclear energy, has been basically anti-human so far, it seems to me. It has had a profoundly destructive effect on human

thinking, despite the assistance it has undoubtedly rendered to many individuals. Psychoanalysis is potent. It is potent in helping people to feel and function better, but it is also potent in making people worse.

The harmful therapeutic effect which psychoanalysis often has is frequently hidden by analysts’ tendencies to blame the patient if he is more disturbed after treatment than before. “He must have been schizophrenic,” they say, making a mystical, Kantian *Ding an sich* of this vague “disease.”

But if psychoanalysts take credit for helping some of their patients, and they rightfully do, they must also take blame for harming others. In my own practice, for example, I find that the most difficult patients to treat are those who have failed with other therapists. In these situations, it is harder to undo the harm which the previous treatment has caused than it is to treat people who have not had the dubious benefits of such unsuccessful treatment.

Many private psychiatric hospitals have large numbers of patients who became worse in office psychoanalytic, or psychoanalytically oriented, treatment. The state hospitals know full well the glib excuses for uselessness and irrational behavior presented on admission by “graduates” of some of the psychoanalytically-oriented hospitals. These people are worse after treatment than before, so we must conclude the treatment harmed them.

#### **The Pernicious Social and Political Effects of Psychoanalysis**

From the social and political point of view, the overall results of psychoanalysis have been far more pernicious, I believe, than even Baran realizes. As often practiced, psychoanalysis is the most potent method yet devised for paralyzing the radical intellectual, and the Jewish radical in particular. Tensions, particularly of a racist kind, fill the air of our country, and vague, covert threats impinge on people these days, particularly when they begin to become politically active. The result is fear and anxiety.

There remains little political organization to provide solidarity and emotional support for such individuals. Indeed, many Left organizations seem so frightened that they tend to extrude the member who becomes uneasy. When in trouble, people no longer go to the rabbis and ministers for help and courage. Failing to realize that they are responding to the stimuli of a pervasively contradictory and threatening society, they consider themselves “disturbed” and seek psychoanalytic, or psychotherapeutic, help.

The analyst, “high in a tower up a chamber to the east,” doubts the existence of harassment in the present, suspects the patient’s reaction is “paranoid” and assumes that the roots of the fears of the present lie somewhere in the past. The patient accepts this concept and withdraws interest from the present in order to examine the past. Amorphously and sincerely, analyst and patient then go to work examining the latter’s childhood.

The paralytic effectiveness of the treatment is maximized by the fact that both the patient and the analyst sincerely believe the treatment to be efficacious and scientific. This belief is enhanced by the fact that the treatment is sometimes accompanied by diminished discomfort, particularly if political activity, and consequent harassment, are discontinued.

And while the patient searches his past, the world goes on and opportunities are missed. I have often wondered what the role of the flourishing Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute was in 1932 and 1933, with particular reference to the paralysis of intellectuals of the Social Democratic Party.

The political effect of psychoanalysis has all too often been a substitution of procrasti-

nation for courage. "Contemporary moderns," psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis writes, "often put their backs to the couch, and in so doing may fail to put their shoulders to the wheel." This is the result, as Baran notes, of accepting a most changeable society as unchangeable, and leads to submission and conformity, rather than to change and creativity.

#### **Search versus Dogma in Psychoanalysis**

Within psychoanalysis, as in all other parts of ideology, a struggle is going on between scientific search and mystical dogma. Within the field itself, even today, increasing numbers of psychoanalysts are rejecting the biopsychological dogma of Freud. It does not work. Instead, they are searching out new and useful truths in the nature of the society.

While, as Baran points out, these psychologico-social trends still fall short of the truth, they do represent movement in a progressive direction within the field. They indicate a change toward increased recognition of the still basically unrecognized primacy of societal factors in molding our biological clay. It depends on Marxists, in the field and outside it, to point out that the essential "societal factor" which must be seen and changed is the existence of class contradictions within our society, contradictions which can be resolved *only*, so far as I am concerned, by a peaceful transfer of power from the "elite" to the people, through extension of American political democracy into the economic field as well.

#### **Search versus Dogma in Marxism**

The struggle between search and dogma is not limited to psychoanalysis, however. It exists in the field of Marxism as well. Many previously accepted concepts may require correction and even – to use a dirty word – "revision." Science, after all, revises its conceptualizations when formerly useful ideas become a drag; isn't Marxism also a science?

One important area where Marxist thinking might warrant re-examination is its tendency to damn the entire bourgeoisie. Psychoanalysis, an important ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both its healthy and unhealthy trends. There is a tradition of political and scientific democracy deeply rooted in both the American bourgeoisie and American psychoanalysis. It was this democratic tradition *in the bourgeoisie itself* which drove back McCarthy, despite the signal absence of effective help from labor or the Left.

A fundamental conflict exists within the ideology of the American bourgeoisie. On the one hand, there is the tradition of freedom of peaceful dissent, which partly underlies America's previously unmatched technological progress, and from which emerged John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. On the other hand, there is the fact of oligarchic economic control, with its ideological derivations of "elitism" and obscurantism. This conflict exists in the minds of every bourgeois, even those named Rockefeller and Stevenson.

Since there are such constructive, honest, democratic trends within bourgeois ideology, it appears that it might be worth while to work openly and honestly with the bourgeoisie. Such honest intellectual interaction is far more desirable than renouncing the constructive influence we can have on the bourgeoisie, and leaving the ideological field to Roman Catholic dogma and elite fascism.

#### **Search versus Dogma in Religion**

The struggle between scientific search and mysterious dogma exists in the much neglected and oft-maligned field of religion as well. The mainstreams of American Protestantism and Judaism today emphasize *search* – the search of each man for his own God, the attempt of each individual to realize his own potentialities. The monolithic Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, resembles much of the contemporary American psychoanalysis, insofar as both emphasize submission to dogma. The former kneels while the latter lies, each passively

accepting what is presented as the doctrine of a great Jew.

Psychoanalysis, the ideology of the bourgeoisie, reflects both the scientific and dogmatic aspects of the class from which it comes. It, like the bourgeoisie, should be dealt with openly, peacefully, and scientifically, so as to retain that which is good and useful, without keeping the dead and dogmatic. Precision, rather than large emptiness, is the hallmark of science. Let us therefore be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater – whether the baby be Freudian or bourgeois. **P A S**

## **We Need Not Wait**

Peter B. Neubauer, M.D.

Professor Baran has given his article a misleading title and it is therefore difficult to discuss it. A careful outline of the theoretical propositions of both Marxism and psychoanalysis must be the basis of any investigation. Only then will it be possible to come to specific conclusions and to answer the important questions: To what degree may a science present a true advance but still be misused by present conditions of the social order? To what degree is it itself a reflection of these social conditions?

Psychoanalysis would have to be discussed as a theory of the psychology and psychopathology of man, as a technique of treatment and as a tool for research. Similarly one would need an outline of the propositions of a Marxist psychology, or at least to apply consistently the principles of dialectical materialism to the clinical data in order to evolve such a psychology.

Baran is interested in the "social" aspects of Marxian psychology, and he refers to psychoanalysis only to the degree that it has reference to social conflicts. But psychic life can be understood only in its continuous interplay with biologic and social conditions. It is more than their simple reflection. It follows its own laws and its own mechanisms. The great achievement of psychoanalysis is based on Freud's freeing of psychology from the tradition of his time, which had reduced it to biological laws and to the function of the central nervous system. There is a similar danger today in the assumption that by knowing social laws and conflicts one thereby also understands psychic conflicts.

If Baran had been content to discuss the social frame of reference within which the individual functions, he would have given us an important outline. But he went far beyond this and thereby, as I shall try to show, ends up with an anti-psychologic position.

He does not refer once to psychic processes, to the developmental organization, to the symbolic representation of the outside world, to the role of memory, of fantasy and thought processes, neither as a Marxian psychology would present them, nor as psychoanalysis does.

We can easily agree with him when he speaks about the dangers of viewing man too much from the individual point of view, which leads to the opposite mistake, namely, to the psychologizing of social events.

Baran has eloquently presented an outline of social conflicts in a capitalistic society. He stresses the increase of irrationality of our social order enforced by competition and the drive for profits. This in turn becomes an obstacle to human development, leading to an impairment of the spontaneity in man. Social conflicts have a direct and immediate bearing in certain areas of our interest : (1) for the understanding of whatever comprises mental health in the community; (2) for the purpose of prevention of emotional disorders ; and (3) in order to assess

the interplay between the social and neurotic conflict. This is to say, for an understanding of how individual psychological conflict can be reinforced or even exploited by social conditions. But this is insufficient to permit us to accept his definition of neurosis – that it is the irrational reaction to a pernicious social order – nor does it explain his finding that irrationality and aggressiveness in man are a refusal to accept capitalism.

When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the means of production. We have learned that each step in human development is influenced by the human example others give, by the quality of this relationship. From the study of children we have learned to raise these questions: *What* has happened to the child, by *whom*, *when* did it happen in his development, and what are the *specific characteristics* of this child? Unless we have the answers to these four factors in each individual life history, we are not able to understand a child's psychic life. It is true that the parents are exposed to social conditions, are influenced by them, and transmit them to the child. But again, the transmission is not a simple reflection. The parents, too, transform their social experience through their psychic organization, their degree of understanding or rationality, their degree of maturity. We are forced to explore each individual's own life history and we are happy to say that we have such an Individual Psychology today. While there is danger of over-emphasizing the individual, there is also the possibility of giving the individual unlimited attention.

We find that certain specific events and experiences within this relationship can lead to an arrest of further development, and that these patients then repeat over and over again their early pattern, which has become partially independent of changes in their environment. Our patients have lost the freedom to change with changing circumstances. Even if there should be a vast improvement in the social order, they would be bound to the old because psychic enslavement does not permit a free interaction between the individual and his environment.

These important processes take place within the family. The concept of a psychological environment is significantly not acceptable to Baran because it does not stand for society at large. But we need a concept which refers to that part of society to which an individual has a significant emotional relationship, namely, *his* environment. The role of the family as a bridge between the individual and social organization is psychologically of utmost importance. When damage has been done to a child *within* the family, so that neurotic conflict has emerged, the stepping out of the child into society will have only a secondary modifying influence on his further development. The extra-familial experience may ameliorate or reinforce the original problem, but we cannot regard it as the direct cause. The family has the capacity to protect the individual from the pathological influences of the social order, or the family may be the seat of such disturbances as to be responsible for much more serious pathology than is generally found in the community.

The capacity to love, to understand, and to reach maturity varies from individual to individual in each society. We have to emphasize these differences, for they alone permit us to understand why some of our patients suffer from phobias and others from depression, why some from an inhibition of sexual function, others from a perversion, why some are addicted to alcohol and others to success or to failure in the same society. This is the main interest of psychopathology. Statements by Baran that our capitalist society is responsible for sexual inhibition present a generalization beyond reason. Have these disturbances not occurred in other societies and isn't it true that we find not only inhibition but also the opposite – selfish indulgence with insufficient controls?

If we are not interested in studying the individual life history, the phases of psychological development which are particularly vulnerable to certain influences, the talents of each

individual, his capacity to submit to present conditions or to transcend them, then we do not have a psychology. It is for this reason that Baran has not discussed any of the contributions which psychoanalysis has made to an understanding of these essential variables, and we therefore have no basis for discussing the correctness of this part of psychoanalytic theory. Without such an individual psychology, Baran arrives at the conclusion that "the insistence on the possibility of altering character structure on the individual plane is in itself an ideology," and that "the limits to the cure of man's soul are set by the illness of the society in which he lives." Such a formulation does not take into account the contradictions in each social and individual organization, the endless attempt of man to master nature, to change himself, and to substitute rationality for irrationality. As Freud has stated it, where there is *id* there shall be *ego*.

It is possible to learn about those psychological processes which arrest development and set off a neurotic repetition of conflict. It is possible to develop techniques to free the individual from such inner enslavement. It is possible to use professional skill and the continuous effort of one individual to help another individual free himself from internal and external restrictions.

It is true, however, that there are psychiatric disorders which are often less responsive to our intervention. If Baran had been satisfied, as he said he would be, to outline a sociology of the psyche, he would have made it easier for us to study his findings with the care which they deserve, but he drew conclusions which attempt to explain psychopathology while neglecting psychological processes and neglecting the individual, and therefore he has fallen prey to some errors he criticizes in others. Even when man shall have mastered society in such a way that its resources will be sufficient "to give to *each* according to *his* needs," we will still have need of a science of the individual and his inner life. In the meantime we can do better than just wait. **P A S**

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## Two Recent Marxist Views of Psychoanalysis

Norman Reider, M.D.

*Soviet Survey*, a London quarterly devoted to providing facts and analyses of the Soviet Union, presents in its issue for July-September, 1959, an account of a special conference called on the initiative of the Presidium of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR for the purpose of discussing the problems of ideological struggle with modern Freudianism. The account was written by P.P. Bondarenko and M. Kh. Rabinovich and originally appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii*, February, 1959. According to the editors of *Soviet Survey*, this document is of particular interest because it represents a new line in Soviet psychology and not just the view of an individual writer. This new line, they say, is much better informed and much more sophisticated than the official line of ten or even five years ago, and the conference in question dealt with problems which previously would have been ignored as wholly irrelevant.

The implication in the title of the conference that there is something modern about Freudianism is a promising beginning, but unfortunately the promise is not fulfilled. An introductory speech by Professor S.A. Sarkisov holds that bourgeois countries have accepted Freud's theory that the basic forces determining human behavior are unconscious biological instincts originating in the sexual experiences of infancy. This unfortunate kind of inaccuracy characterizes a great deal of the document, which deals heavily in criticism of Freudians who use psychoanalytic methods "to mislead and pacify the workers." Many of the speeches that

follow are clearly not scientific discussions but polemics against the imputed political implication of Freudianism.

This pattern is sustained by F.V. Bassin, who attack the sociological applications of psychoanalytic theory. What is significant in this paper is the repeated statement that attempts to reconcile Freudian and Pavlovian theories must be fought. However, a cogent remark is made in the statement that Freud's error lay not in the fact that he gave much attention to the problem of conflict, but in his erroneous formulation of the problem. Freud is obviously not forgiven for having deserted the field of neuropathology, since "he renounced the study of neurosis as a consequence of disturbance of the normal interrelation of nervous processes and adopted a path of subjective idealism." There is a still further yielding in this critique of Freud in the acknowledgment that an impulse behind a particular action can influence behavior despite its being unconscious. Even though Bassin states that this hypothesis is given a mystical interpretation by Freud and that Pavlov's explanations are more scientific, it is nevertheless a distinct change for the official attitude to concede even this much in regard to the forces of the unconscious. On the whole, however, it is clear that for the most part the Soviets still consider psychology scientific only when it is neurophysiology.

This concession Bassin negates in the rest of his paper. He poses to Freudians the following question: "How can the Oedipus complex occur in children fed artificially and not from the mother's breast?" "What happened to the Oedipus complex in the matriarchal period, when children did not know their own fathers?" "What happens when children are brought up from infancy in orphanages?" He states further, "These simple questions proved fatal to the Freudians and to this day they are powerless to answer them, since the facts refute their attempt to reply from Freudian positions." The truth is that these excellent questions have been considered and investigated by many psychoanalysts. For example, Anna Freud's and Dorothy Burlingham's *Infants Without Families* published in 1944, presents some fascinating data on one of the questions. Such investigations have not proved fatal to psychoanalysis but on the contrary have fostered the growth of its theory and practice.

A paper by Dr. N. G. Gartshtein is primarily noteworthy for attacking two articles that had been printed previously in the *Monthly Review* by Dr. Lawrence Kubie (March 1958) and by myself (December 1957), the latter a reply to Dr. D. Fedotov's "The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis" which appeared in MR, December 1957. There is nothing new in this paper. I am quoted as saying that Freud and his followers discovered an objective method for the investigation of the brain, a remark which is held by Gartshtein to be completely unfounded. I agree. Moreover, I never made any such statement, which an examination of the original article (p. 61) will show. Translations from one language to another are occasionally inaccurate. But this sort of knocking down of straw men is symptomatic of an over-defensiveness which would not need to be resorted to if the Soviet official position were sound scientifically.

In my opinion the most significant part of this symposium is contributed by Dr. P. K. Anokhin, who draws attention to the need of a more profound and more concrete approach to Freudism without over-simplification of Freudian views. The two most substantial remarks by Anokhin are: (1) "It was necessary to put forward opposing scientific-materialistic data to explain those complex intimate questions which Freudism has monopolized, trying to give them its own interpretation. It must be remembered that Freudism has not remained constant; it has changed, and its arguments have changed also. It cannot be said that Freudism ignores social phenomena; it distorts their nature and gives an incorrect explanation of people's behavior." (2) "It was necessary to squeeze Freudism out of those scientific fields which it was trying to exploit for reactionary ends, and to give a scientific-materialistic explanation of psychological phenomena." The rest of the symposium is largely repetitious by way of

criticism of Freudian theory - particularly with relation to dreams and psychosomatic medicine - and its application to sociology.

All this is old stuff except for the bit of yielding as to (1) the importance of the unconscious in human motivation, (2) the admission that Freudian theory has been over-simplified, and (3) the suggestion that its subject matter and content must be taken over by the Pavlovians. This acknowledgement of the importance of the content of psychological data, which has hitherto been ignored as a kind of epiphenomenon, is in a sense new; but in the main, the anti-Freudian arguments are old, largely polemic, and are based upon incomplete appreciation of Freud's libido theory. For the most part these critics continue the argument as if Freud had written nothing since 1914 except the death instinct theory. The great advances that have been made in ego psychology are ignored. Thus the promise of a "new look" is disappointing.

A second contribution appeared in the October 1959 issue of *Monthly Review* by Dr. Paul A. Baran on "Marxism and Psychoanalysis." This is a much more urbane, sophisticated, and knowledgeable approach to the subject than that of the Soviet scientists. It is refreshing to find that an economist like Baran has a better insight into psychological processes than the Russian writers, who are so steeped in the neurophysiological approach inherent in Pavlov. Baran perceives something new on the horizon, a sort of amalgam of psychoanalysis with some quasi-Marxian sociological notions. This doctrine, which he calls "socio-psychologism," holds that man is influenced by society, while equating "society" to the environment.

Let us follow Baran in what he considers the implications of socio-psychologism. First, he disposes of the theory that since human nature determines the historical process and since human nature is unalterable, all attempts to transform society are doomed. In contrast, socio-psychologism holds that human development is determined by the social milieu, or the nature of interpersonal relationships, from which it follows that improvements can be made by suitable "adjustments" in the prevailing environment. Socio-psychologism, according to Baran, uncovers horrors in our culture and therefore is nearer to the realities of capitalism, but it proceeds to blame our difficulties on our own inefficiencies and refuses to see the fundamental causes of our problems in the very nature of capitalism itself. Baran holds that Marxists are in error in combating such new versions of the psychological approach by means of their old arguments, and that it is a mistake not to extract what is good from socio-psychologism.

Baran's arguments are incisive, at times witty, at times sarcastic, and at times erroneous. But as I indicated above, it is decidedly refreshing to find a Marxist who does not hold that all of Freud is bunk. Baran acknowledges that Freud directed his studies to a rational understanding of the irrational motivations in man. Where Freud goes wrong in his view, is not in his aim but in holding that human nature is invariable. Baran believes that changes have taken place in "human nature," for example, an increase in rationality with changes in the methods of production. This has caused a change in the mental habits of man. Baran's meaning is not entirely clear here, but I take it that he means that magical thinking plays a smaller role in the mental processes of man than previously.

Baran's thesis holds that the alienation of man from his means of production leads to the madness of our economic system, which in turn leads to the alienation of man from himself. Under such circumstances, human rationality becomes crippled and bears no relationship to the prerequisites for and the needs of human health, happiness, and development. Another way of stating his thesis leads to the conclusion that the conflict between "partial rationality" and "total rationality" leads to man's psychological aberrations.

Baran concludes that irrationality in our times is not a development from unalterable human instincts, but rather that advances in capitalism have led to a radical subjugation of

the nature of man himself. Whereas previously violence was used by the ruling class to keep the workers down, now the capitalist enforces a subtler "adjustment." Now the worker has become a more diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable worker, but a high price has been paid in the loss of spontaneity. Again Baran's superior approach leads him to say, in contrast to the Russians quoted above, that he does not think this is a plot on the part of capitalists to turn workers into "diligent, docile, efficient, and reliable workers," but that this trend derives from an inherent characteristic of a mode of production which is based upon commodity exchange.

Baran's thoughts lead him to make an almost heretical remark that Marx, Engels, and Freud all strove towards the same goal: to increase human happiness via freedom of individual development and the capacity to experience sensual gratifications. However, he holds that under capitalism aggression is so disciplined and channeled toward the attainment of success that it leads to what Freud called the "alienation of man from himself." Therefore, according to Baran, the only change that is possible in man must come as a result of a change in the framework of his socio-economic condition.

Baran's ideas, which I have of course abbreviated, are superior to the neurophysiological approach of the Russians in holding that at least there are innate biologically determined drives that do play a role in psychic development. However, he stumbles on the old anti-Freudian dogma that human nature is unalterable and that all attempts to transform human character are therefore doomed. If the innate biologically-determined, instinctual drives have shown a certain fixity, it does not follow that their derivatives cannot change. As a matter of fact, it is the effort to understand the very effects of all sorts of forces on the innate structure which constitutes one of the major objectives of psychoanalytic study. Moreover, Baran's argument falls back on an old saw, namely, that treatment of emotional disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him adjust to his environment.

Baran's psychological contribution lies in his belief that human nature has changed, as evidenced by an increase in man's rationality as methods of production have progressed, and that this progress has produced changes in the mental habits of man. This interesting thesis is a simplified attempt to account for whatever changes have taken place in the course of man's historical development. To attempt to cover this subject would necessitate an extremely long exposition, and I shall therefore restrict myself to only one point. Baran seems to ignore that there is ontogenetic development of the psyche, which is of necessity a very slow process. From a condition in which magical thinking holds sway there gradually develops a variety of educative processes which lead to rational thinking. Moreover, there are forms of magical infantile thinking that remain throughout each individual's life. If this kind of magical thinking is what Baran means by "human nature," then I hold that it is likely to remain unchanged so long as man exists on this planet. If the Marxist ideal is the production of infants who are born with a perceptual, discriminative, and executive psychical apparatus that can at birth distinguish between Mozart and boogie-woogie and have a knowledge of the calculus and the Bill of Rights, I hold that this is form of sheer irresponsible idealism which is being foisted on the masses as one of the new tranquilizers. Further, by putting emphasis upon rationality versus irrationality, Baran misses the point of the difference between emotional life and intellectual life. The relationship between the two is a most interesting area of study, but the equation of rationality and healthy emotional life, implying as it does that the healthy human being must be an intellectual, is taking for granted much more than there is any warrant for in Baran's argument.

In our present social structure there is much to foster irrational drives toward success and a sadistic type of competitive life. It draws out much of what is aggressive in ourselves

and distorts love relationships, affection, mutual respect, and cooperation. But to suggest that a socialist transformation of the socio-economic structure will *per se* make for major changes in human nature and in the human psyche, though a consummation apparently to be wished, is, to use Baran's own phrase, "claptrap." Nor can Baran take refuge in the argument, which he implies, that whatever defects exist in present-day socialist societies are vestiges of the capitalist order. A wiser interpretation is one suggested by Engels, that under socialism man would cease suffering like an animal and begin to suffer like a human being. But Baran's fostering of the thesis that economic changes in themselves will resolve human problems is a form of sheer irresponsibility.

If Baran really believes that his thesis is scientific and not merely an article of faith, then he should be able to demonstrate how a psychological system based on Marxism could step by step indicate how economic changes would influence interpersonal relationships, which in turn would influence cultural patterns, which in turn would influence the family structure, which in turn would influence psychodynamic mechanisms and psychic development. Any systematic attempt to explain what Baran holds as his thesis need not follow exactly the above formula, to be sure, but at least it should avoid the mythological monstrosity that methods of production have a direct effect upon the human psyche. Even the followers of Pavlov would not hold that changes in the methods of production cause directly observable changes in patterns of cerebral-neuronal activity. This even they would recognize as pseudo-Marxism.

Dialectical materialism in psychology should be able to propose (1) a systematic theory of the development of the psyche, which would serve as a basis for some sort of study of biologically determined drives and their vicissitudes under different conditions; (2) a theory of symptom-formation; and (3) a theory of treatment. At present the official Soviet position has, at best no theory of psychic development (a remarkable thing in view of the emphasis of Marxists on the historical approach); a neurophysiological theory of symptom-formation which is detached from emotional problems as such and considers the content of symptoms as meaningless waste products; and a chaotic theory of treatment made up of a conglomerate of biochemical, neurophysiological, and social elements, all essentially doctrine-oriented rather than individual-oriented.

Two encouraging signs in regard to the problem of Marxism and Freudism to exist. Once I pointed out in my earlier article in MR (December, 1957) in which I stated that there were many things incomplete and possibly inaccurate in psychoanalytic theory and practice, but they were none of the items that are stressed in the Soviet critiques. Psychoanalytic theory and practice are constantly being revised in the light of new findings in experimental and clinical fields, and the best place to find these changes is in the psychoanalytic journals themselves. They illustrate that psychoanalysts are self-critical. The second sign is one that I picked up from listening to American psychiatrists who have spent time recently in visits to psychiatric facilities in the USSR. In spite of official attitudes, when these psychiatrists have discussed clinical material (and not theory) with Soviet colleagues they found in the more advanced clinical centers little reliance upon official theory, but a reliance upon an understanding of psychodynamics and a growing clinical experience which is essentially sound from the American observers' point of view. This is not the first time that theory and practice have not gone hand in hand, and is illustrative of something that has been frequently pointed out: that sooner or later if one attempts to treat individuals he must perforce come in contact with and treat patients via a dynamic psychotherapy; he must perforce come to the utilization of Freudian concepts whether he acknowledges them or not. P A S

## Reply

Paul A. Baran

Although differing among themselves in emphasis and detail, the preceding observations on my lecture "Marxism and Psychoanalysis" center on three broad issues. First, the scope of the human predicament in our society; second, the causes of the prevailing condition; and third, the extent to which currently practiced psychotherapy may be able to cure individuals seeking its help. While it would far transcend my competence to attempt to "cover" even approximately such formidable ground, I will try a necessarily brief summary of my principal reflections on the views advanced by my critics.

The first issue is raised most explicitly by Dr. Krich. "All of us," he writes, "live under monopoly capitalism, but only 15 percent of, breakdown under its pressure or are seized with its 'macro-madness.' The rest of us hang on to our culture's 'micro-sense'." This statement reveals, I submit, that its author missed not only the point of my lecture but, what is much more serious, he has missed the intent and content of the theoretical work of both Marx and Freud. For neither Marx's sociology nor Freud's psychology is concerned solely or even primarily with social and psychic *pathology*, with pronounced, diagnostically identifiable social and psychic illness calling for specific pragmatic therapy. At least in this regard Marx and Freud were treading on the same ground. Both were seeking to comprehend the visible pathological excrescences of social existence in their relation to the "statistical norm," to discern in the condensed, one might say exaggerated, manifestation of suffering the less intense but universal malaise hidden beneath the relatively calm surface of everyman's everyday life. Treating these excrescences as "deplorable exceptions" that have to be explained, and if possible cured, may well be a legitimate preoccupation of what Krich commends as "clinical empiricism," but it is certainly not conducive to insight into the fundamental problem involved. Indeed, far from referring exclusively to the "15 percent of us [who] breakdown," the problem is precisely the nature of the culture to which the 85 percent "hang on" – the culture that produces the more or less violent breakdown of the "only" 15 percent, and the more or less supportable misere psychologique (Freud) of the 85 percent.

This is not the place to attempt a description of this culture or to detail its repressive, irrational, neurosis-breeding characteristics. Some of the relevant considerations were indicated briefly in my lecture and there is abundant material on this subject in the sociological and psychological literature. Whether we examine the general cultural standards of our society or the prevailing state of education, whether we consider race relations or juvenile delinquency, whether we think about the increasingly pronounced breakdown of the family or the incidence of alcoholism and suicide – there can be no doubt about the illness of our society, about the glaring incompatibility of its institutions with the health, happiness, and development of man. To be quite clear about it: the question relates *not* to the *subjective* reaction to the prevailing condition on the part of those whom it affects. Even if all 100 percent of society, not only Krich's 85 percent, were content to "hang on" to the existing state of affairs, the finding of the *objective* inadequacy of the existing social order would remain valid. What is more, such a state of mass intoxication and "tranquilization" would in itself represent the most conspicuous and indeed most dangerous aspect of the entire pathological syndrome. It can be, and usually is, objected that under such circumstances there would be no criteria left for judging an existing state of society. Freud was fully aware of this difficulty even if only implicitly indicating a solution: "In the neurosis of an individual we can use as a starting point the contrast presented to us between the patient

and his environment which we assume to be 'normal.' No such background as this would be available for any *society similarly affected*; it would have to be supplied in some other way." (Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, London, 1955, p. 142. Italics added.) This "other way" is social thought – the age-old philosophical, scientific, artistic, and practical effort to develop standards for man's "right way of life," to clarify the concept of what constitutes a "good society." What Dr. Krich haughtily dismisses because of "operational inutility" is actually not just my modest bit of theorizing but all of the truth-searching tradition of mankind, whether it has found expression in the Bible or in the Koran, in the meditations of the Greek philosophers or in the creations of the Renaissance artists, in the writings of Shakespeare and Tolstoy, or in the far-flung studies of Marx and Freud. All of these endeavors were "operationally useless" – except that it is thanks to just this unremitting, all-embracing quest for the clarification and creation of the prerequisites of the "good life" that we are able today to specify with much more precision than in earlier times what the conditions are that need to be fulfilled for the somatic and psychic welfare and growth of man. The denial of the possibility to identify, let alone establish, such conditions reflects either the ideological blinkers of empiricist agnosticism that (by no means fortuitously) obscure intellectual vision in our society, or, (worse still), the vested interests of those whose primary concern is to discredit theoretically and obstruct practically all radical departure from the *status quo*.

It is with reference to these indispensable conditions for human welfare that we have to examine the problem explicitly or implicitly raised by all my critics: whether there has been and is a continual improvement of human life within the framework of the capitalist order. The answer is far from simple. There has been in this country as well as in other advanced capitalist countries a tremendous development of productive resources. It has resulted in a considerable rise of the standard of living and in an equally pronounced reduction of the burden of human toil. The process of rationalization and enlightenment of which this growth of productivity is intimately related has also led to a certain liberalization of mores and to a certain relaxation of tabus, weakening the reign of superstition and obscurantism. Yet it would be inadmissibly rash to jump from these undeniable facts to the conclusion that these processes have improved the psychic welfare of people. Comparisons over time are notoriously difficult, particularly if what is to be compared are psychic states of different people at different times, but a strong case can be made for the proposition that the material advances attained under capitalism have been bought at a very high price in terms of repression and alienation. In the words of one expert, speaking for many, "There is no indication that the mental health of the nation has improved. Delinquency is steadily rising; juvenile drug addicts probably run into tens of thousands (a phenomenon unknown in any other part of the Western world); we constantly hear of infantile schizophrenics, and the number of neurotics is certainly not less than it was under the sternest Victorian upbringing." (Dr. Melitta Schmideberg, director of clinical service, Association for the Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders, in *Phi Delta Kappan*, December, 1959.) The rise of juvenile delinquency – probably one of the most eloquent indices of the deterioration of the psychic state of young people and of the conditions obtaining in their families – cannot be disputed:

The records of juvenile courts, compiled by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, show that the number of children brought before the courts increased from 300,000 in 1948 to 435,000 in 1953. Only 10 percent of this increase could be explained by the growth of the juvenile population. The court figures show the trend, but they do not show the full extent of juvenile delinquency. The Senate Committee on Juvenile Delinquency estimates that there are at least three juvenile offenders brought to the attention of the police for every child actually

brought to court. So, at the current rate, the number of youngsters who get into trouble with the police each year is about one million and a quarter. If the rate continues to rise, as it has since 1948, the number will reach 1,700,000 in 1960. (Irving Adler, *What We Want Of Our Schools*, New York, 1957, pp. 109-110)

Is there any justification for the view, apparently held by Drs. Neubauer and Krich, that it is an important "offset" to this profound illness of society that in our time there has been an increase in sexual activity, that now "we find not only inhibition but also the opposite - selfish indulgence with insufficient controls"? (Neubauer) It is surely a remarkable kind of "depth psychology" which judges the intensity of repression endured and the extent of genuine gratification experienced by people on the basis of the "turnover in the sex market" as measured by the number of sexual transactions registered by Kinsey and kindred researchers. One might have hoped that, if nothing else, this fallacy of psychological reasoning would be put to rest by the work of Freud. Indeed, it would seem to me that the very opposite of what is maintained by Drs. Neubauer and Krich comes nearer the truth. As the objective possibilities for human liberation from want and toil and exploitation expand, as the gap between the freedom that *could* be realized on the basis of the attained development of productive resources and the misery enforced by the capitalist order widens, the repressive function of capitalist institutions and culture becomes more rather than less pronounced, the mechanisms enforcing "adjustment," conformity, and passive "hanging on" become more elaborate and more pervasive. And the more the realization of society's objective potentialities comes to depend on people's capacity to seize the historic opportunity, the stronger becomes the dependence of the system on obscuring and confusing the issues, on the denial of the very existence of those potentialities, and on the cultivation of a sense of contentment with such pseudo-happiness, pseudo-love, and pseudo-productivity as may be attainable within the capitalist order. The resulting state of deception, delusion, and paralysis thus turns, in the current phase of capitalist development, into the principal obstacle to human advancement.

This brings me to the second question raised by my critics, namely, the *causes* of the existing situation. Here Dr. Reider is flogging a dead or a wrong horse when inveighing against the "sheer irresponsibility" or "mythological monstrosity" of a view that "economic changes in themselves will resolve human problems," or that "methods of production have a *direct* effect upon the human psyche." The key words in those sentences are clearly the ones that I have underscored: "in themselves" and "direct." But who ever claimed that economic changes *in themselves* have a *direct* effect upon the human psyche? Certainly not Marx who repeatedly returned to the intricate relation between the socio-economic base and the so-called "super-structure," and whose concept of alienation encompasses the very heart of the psychological problem. Nor can it be fairly said about the lecture to which my critics have addressed themselves that it postulates a "direct" relation between the economic and the psychic spheres. There I was concerned precisely with the *mediations* between those two realms, with what might be called the "transmission belts" which connect the relations of production prevailing in a given epoch to the psychic structure of the individuals living in that epoch. In fact, the lecture represents nothing if not an attempt to draw attention to some of these "transmission belts" which are usually ignored or sidestepped in psychological thought. And since the role played by intrafamily relations is surely not one of modern psychology's neglected stepchildren, I did not feel an urgent need to emphasize a factor the importance of which is generally recognized even if not always put in the proper theoretical context.

If it is an impermissible oversimplification and vulgarization of Marxian thought to disregard the "transmission belts" and to consider the psychic process as a simple, direct reflection

of socio-economic relations, it is even more erroneous and more dangerous to treat these "transmission belts" not for what they are but as ultimate, irreducible sources of human conduct. This position is the essence of what I called psychologism and leads inevitably to postulating an autonomous psyche producing and reproducing itself in the lofty realm of the spirit far removed from the concrete, material bases of human existence. And the "mythological monstrosity" of such a concept of the human soul is not banished in the least by a "generous" acknowledgement that there may be after all some "interdependence" between the psychic sphere and that of the forces and relations of production. For the mere recognition of the existence of interdependence means very little both theoretically and practically unless it is accompanied by the identification of the active, leading component in the interrelation. There is not much to be gained from what may look at first like the profound wisdom of the proposition that everything depends on everything else. The crux of the matter is to discover what accounts primarily for the dynamics of the entire structure, what constitutes the Archimedean point from which it may be possible to move, to change the whole system. The neglect of this consideration leads both to theoretical sterility and to practical impotence. Thus Erich Fromm's insistence "that progress can only occur when changes are made simultaneously in the economic, socio-political and cultural spheres; that any progress restricted to one sphere is destructive to progress in all spheres" (*The Sane Society*, pp. viii-ix, italics in the original), while appearing to be most radical, would justify the renunciation from all meaningful action. Since social energies are limited, since different changes require different time spans, since finally some changes are more important than others - if for no other reason than because once undertaken they cause or facilitate other, derivative changes - the categorical imperative that either all changes should take place at the same time or none be undertaken at all amounts practically to a counsel of passivity, to support for the status quo.

It should be needless to say that the recognition of the necessity to assign different weights to different elements in a relation, that the emphasis on the inequality of the strength and influence of different forces making up the historical process is not the same as the assignment of an exclusive, "direct," causative function to any one particular factor (or combination of factors). What it does mean is that changes in certain areas are more important, more consequential than changes in other areas, that action exercised in one segment of the whole has a greater impact on the whole than action exercised in other segments. Accordingly the Marxist view that the relations of production and the socio-economic structure resting upon them play a crucially important part in shaping all aspects of human existence not only does not exclude but indeed demands the concrete specification of intermediate links, of all the complex interrelations which weld the disparate facets of the social process into an organic whole.

But, to repeat, the recognition of the existence of this complex interrelation should not be permitted to become the night in which all cats are gray. It is not the psychic make-up of the worker that has caused the emergence of the giant corporation or of the automated factory. It is the objective economic process that brought into being these institutions of monopoly capitalism, and these institutions of monopoly capitalism have exercised a profound impact on the psychic structures of the individuals caught in their nets. And this does not imply that employment in an automated factory "by itself" changes "directly" the psychic of the worker, nor does it mean that in some way even the changes that do take place in the psychic of the worker have no "feedback" effect on the working principles of the corporation or the factory.

What it does call for – and imperatively – is dealing with first things first, distinguishing of the carriage to the horse rather than to the cart.

In the light of these considerations one can only rub one's eyes astonishment at Dr. Neubauer's argument: "When we explore the causes of, let us say, a phobia, our patients do not inform us that their central conflict stems from their relationship to social institutions or from their role in connection with the means of production." This is indeed "clinical empiricism" gone wild! What would be the need for any analysis if all we had to do to establish the causes of any human and social phenomenon were register whatever information may be supplied by the individuals affected? I wonder how many somatic patients inform their physicians that the Koch bacillus is the cause of tuberculosis of their lungs, or how many mental patients inform their therapists that their infantile fantasies or the methods of child rearing to which they were exposed have something to do with their character formation? And for that matter, how many businessmen report that their profits or losses are due to certain developments in the realm of aggregate saving and investment? As Marx once remarked, "all science would be superfluous if the appearance of things coincided directly with their essence."

When it comes to the third issue raised in the preceding articles – the therapeutic value of psychoanalysis – the discussion becomes difficult indeed. Having no professional qualifications in this area, I must confine myself to a few theoretical observations. As stated in the concluding paragraph of my lecture, I do *not* deny the "possibility of individuals who are ill finding a measure of relief through currently available means of psychiatric treatment." In other words, I am perfectly willing to grant that psychiatry (of whatever doctrinal orientation) may be capable of enhancing the patient's ability to cope with the surrounding reality and/or to carry his travails with a lessened sense of unhappiness. Yet, as Freud recognized, "neurosis and psychosis are both of them an expression of the rebellion of the *id* against the outer world, of its 'pain,' unwillingness to adapt itself to necessity ... or, if one prefers, of its incapacity to do so." ("The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis," *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 279.)

This raises a problem of the utmost importance. The "outer world" against which the "id" rebels is both a physical and a social world; on the one hand, the hardships, privations, and toil imposed by scarcity and the effort required by man's struggle with nature; on the other hand, the repression, compulsion, and suffering which a social order based upon the exploitation of man by man inflicts upon the individual. To be sure, both of these "outer worlds" are aspects of the same reality; it is indispensable, however, to see them in their unity and dialectical interaction as well as in their specificity and differentiation. For to the extent to which the individual rebels against the constraints of the physical world and the oppressiveness of the social order founded upon and resulting from it, his rebellion is a rebellion against what Freud refers to as "necessity." Insofar, however, as the oppressiveness of the social order is no longer a reflection and inevitable outgrowth of physical scarcity but a means for the perpetuation of the existing relations of production in the interests of a privileged, exploitative minority, to this extent the individual's rebellion ceases to be a rebellion against "necessity." If he is caught – as he usually is – in the comprehensive network of bourgeois ideology, the main tenet of which is the treatment of *social* relations as if they were physical, natural relations, his rebellion becomes misguided, shifts from the actual source of his suffering to an imaginary source and develops into a destructive and self-destructive drive. Only if he is capable of piercing the fog of bourgeois mentality and of recognizing that it is the social order in which he lives that blocks the attainment of genuine plenty and the growth, developmental, and freedom of man, can the individual turn his rebellion against the *real* obstacles to his happiness and thus direct his protest against a meaningful

target. To avoid a possible misunderstanding: I do not mean to suggest that the social order and its injunctions do not confront the individual as a necessity. The necessity involved is, however, a dialectical necessity: ineluctable and inexorable at one stage of historic development, it is brittle and overthrowable at another – given sufficient determination, courage, and insight on the part of people.

If psychoanalysis would undertake to advance the individual's understanding of the precise nature of the "outer world" which imposes upon him his privations and his suffering and thus reorient his protest from fetishes to the actual causes of his distress, it would perform a progressive task. Yet such has not by any means been the function of psychoanalysis, as pointed out by Dr. Lehrman. Freud himself, as well as most of his followers, subsumed both aspects of the "outer world" – the physical and the social – under the concept of "necessity," with this necessity seen as stemming from essentially unalterable biologically determined libidinous drives. Even some sociologically-minded writers such as G. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse, tend unwittingly to obscure the matter by attributing the "necessity" of the "outer world" in the present historical epoch to "civilization" or to "modern industrial society" rather than to the specific, concrete socio-economic relations of monopoly capitalism. Quite naturally, if the "outer world" is considered to be an immovable wall, or, as in socio-psychologism, a somewhat elastic but essentially unchangeable enclosure – the only way of dealing with the problem of the individual is to reduce as much as possible his unwillingness or incapacity to adapt himself to this situation, to curtail and destroy his individuality. What Dr. Reider derisively refers to as an "old saw" – that "treatment of emotional disturbances invariably tends to take the fight out of an individual and make him adjust to his environment" – is thus not a fortuitous outcome of therapy caused by the way it is "often practiced" (Dr. Lehrman); it is related to the very nature of the cure that it sets out to provide. And this is not contradicted by such successes as it may be able to attain. For these successes consist at best in "transfers" of individuals from Dr. Krich's 15 percent group to Dr. Krich's 85 percent group. It is very far from my wish to minimize the vital importance of such a "transfer" to the suffering individual. No price in resignation, in "life adjustment," in tranquilization may be too high for him to pay for some ability to get along, to "hang on," to experience some modicum of gratification. It should be clear, however, that this outcome is a cure only in the limited sense of "killing the pain."

A genuine solution of the human predicament in the present stage of our development is not achievable except through a far reaching transformation in the basic existential conditions of society. The process of production which under capitalism dominates man must be brought under his conscious control and turned from a governor into a tool of his life. This is an indispensable prerequisite for true human freedom and therefore also *the fundamental requirement for the growth and development of the individual*. Dr. Neubauer is grievously mistaken in saying that "when man shall have mastered society ... we will *still* have need for a science of the individual and his inner life." (Italics added.) It is exactly the other way round! Only when the socio-economic apparatus of repression, domination, and exploitation is destroyed and replaced by an "association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Marx and Engels) – only then will there be a real "science of the individual and his inner life," for only then will there be a possibility for the existence and flowering of the individual himself. Only when the "furies of private property" are tamed and eventually banished, only when the repressive, destructive, and dehumanizing relations and ideology of capitalism are rendered fossils of a dark past – only then will people be able to face directly and to deal rationally with the challenges, the perplexities, and the immense potentialities encompassed by the human soul. **P A S**

## *Appendix*

# The Soviet View of Psychoanalysis

D. Fedotov. M.D.

In the Soviet Union we greatly honor everything of genuine worth in our own national as well as in world science. We cherish the germs of human reason that have come down to us from past millennia, such as the writings of Hippocrates and the *Canon* of medical science by Abou-Ali-Ibn-Sina (Avicenna); we revere the heroic labors of Edward Jenner and the immortal work of Elie Mechnikov; we admire the scientific realism of Claude Bernard and the immense intellectual sweep of Ivan Schenov. Contrary to the calumnies of our ill-wishers, in no other land is there such profound respect for Charles Darwin and Paul Ehrlich, for Luther Burbank and Louis Pasteur as in ours. We appreciate the scientific contribution of Edward Fleming and the strict objectivity of the outstanding researches of Walter Cannon. And when we speak of the great Ivan Pavlov, the creator of the materialist conception of the higher nervous activity, we at the same time bear in mind that this conception could not have been formulated without the previous labors of Sechenov as well as the great legacy of Darwin's creative genius.

We value highly the works of the advanced scholars of today. But while paying due respect to everything which is truly scientific and serves man's progress, we cannot indifferently let pass theories that are anti-scientific and that drag human reason backward. One such theory, widely held in several countries, is that of psychoanalysis, the creation of the Austrian neuro-pathologist Sigmund Freud.

I have received a kind invitation from the editors of this journal to express myself on the subject indicated in the title. I am glad to do so.

First, it should be pointed out that while in the 1920s, and earlier, a number of physicians in the Soviet Union did evince some interest in psychoanalysis, at the present time Soviet physicians, psychologists, and physiologists read psychoanalytic works only for the purpose of keeping in touch with the the scientific interests of our colleagues abroad.

To meet this purpose of the Soviet scholars, our libraries subscribe to books and journals on psychoanalysis, along with other publications issued abroad. Also, a number of psychoanalytic works, particularly the major works of Freud, are available in Russian translation and are thus accessible to our readers.

But neither the theoretical works of the psychoanalysts nor their practical activities satisfy Soviet scholars and physicians. Indeed, both are rejected as lacking in scientific substance.

The reasons why this attitude toward psychoanalysis has become established in the Soviet Union cannot be grasped without taking into account the tremendous significance that Pavlov's teachings and the materialistic view in general have assumed in Soviet Science.

Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. At the same time, Pavlov's teaching has provided science with a tremendously significant method for such exploration. At the present time, both here and abroad, including the United States, a great deal is being done toward the mastery and development of Pavlov's teachings, and methods are being worked out for the objective exploration of the brain's functioning. The methods of conditioned reflexes and electro-encephalography, particularly, are assuming ever greater importance. In this way, the progress of true science is providing students with a means for the objective investigation of psychic processes.

Yet the psychoanalysts persist in ignoring the achievements of science and continue to treat psychic processes as something utterly independent of the physiological processes in

the brain, the basis of psychic activity. In his *Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud wrote that in its investigations psychoanalysis must cast aside all anatomical, chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant and must operate only with psychological concepts that are specifically psychoanalytic. This position of Freud's continues to characterize, in essence, psychoanalytic work to the present time.

Our materialistic view renders such a dichotomy between the psyche and its material base quite unacceptable. In this ignoring by psychoanalysis of the scientific discoveries in the physiology of the brain we discern a reactionary tendency to drag science backward.

This position of psychoanalysis, the position of separating the psyche from the brain, has, quite naturally, a negative effect in practice. We will permit ourselves only one example.

The psychoanalysts have often turned their attention to ulcerous affections. A number of American authors, starting from psychoanalytic positions, have attempted to solve the problem by considering exclusively psychic factors. Thus, one of the leaders of American psychoanalysis, F. Alexander, asserted in an article which appeared a few years ago that at the basis of the etiology of ulcerous ailments lies a particularly intense and, by its very nature ungratified, "oral-aggressive" urge to satiation, an urge that has been driven into the unconscious. Hence the pathogenesis of ulcers is reduced to a fantastic psychological mechanism. Let us see how the same ailment is viewed by the proponents of Pavlovian views.

Academician K.M. Bykov (Leningrad) and his collaborator I.T. Kurstin, after thorough research, established that the etiology of ulcers is compounded of many factors: type of higher nervous activity, presence of characteristic "ulcerous diathesis," regimen of eating, living conditions, disturbance in the functioning of the vegetative nervous system, and various changes in the biochemistry of the organism. Such a broad understanding of the etiology of ulcers naturally determines the system of treatment. We are convinced that the one-sided view of the psychoanalysts in this matter reflects negatively on their handling of patients, and prevents the timely application of necessary and truly useful methods of treatment.

Similar differences in the understanding and treatment of sicknesses may be cited without end.

We are definitely at variance with the psychoanalytic trends in the understanding of the nature of the psyche. We start from the premise that the psyche is a reflection in the brain of objectively existent reality. Human consciousness reflects human existence and this insures the oneness of man and his environment. This is not the view held by Freud or by any of the later psychoanalytic schools. In psychoanalytic theory, the role of the external world in forming the psyche is extremely limited. The psychoanalytic schools cling to the notion that the unconscious is a separate subdivision of the psyche, essentially independent of the external world, the environment, and one that exerts a decisive influence on man's consciousness. Man is thus fenced off from the world, from the reality of which he is a part and outside of which, indeed without his oneness with which, he is inconceivable. Thus psychoanalysis ignores the role of the external environment in man's psyche, it denies man's social essence. This psychoanalytic conception, too, affects quite negatively psychoanalytic practice. Here, too, we shall give one example.

In the USSR we are all against war, against aggressions and aggressors. We strive to foster in our children a love for peace and a feeling of friendship for all peoples and races of all lands. Psychoanalysis bases itself on the false proposition that man is by nature aggressive. Freud, in a letter to the famous Einstein, wrote that war was "a perfectly natural thing; unquestionably, it has a sound psychological basis and, in fact, it can scarcely be avoided." (*Letters*, Vol. V.) Psychiatrists in America holding to psychoanalytic positions (at least some of them) advise the providing of children with "atomic toys," with comics wallowing in atrocious

crimes. This on the assumption that they would provide an outlet for children's aggressive tendencies. Such views cannot but further the spread of the "war psychosis," contribute to juvenile delinquency, and injure the health of the young.

Psychoanalytic theory denies the historical development of man and his psyche. The determining force in shaping man's conduct is, the psychoanalysts believe, instinct, particularly sex.

But the whole of natural science, the entire development of science, indicates that the psyche is the product of historical development, the result of man's being primarily a creature of social forces. The unbiased study of facts indicates rather convincingly that it is not the sexual instinct that provides virtually all the stimuli for human behavior, but, to the contrary, that the human personality as a whole, shaped by history in a social setting, determines the forms of instinctual manifestations.

Freud and his followers do not hesitate to propound a psychoanalytic theory of society and morals. They explain such phenomena as national oppression, the behavior of criminals, the social activities of people as manifestations of the same blind elemental forces, innate instincts, and drives.

Characteristic in this connection, for example, is the way in which Freud attempts to explain the inferior status of women which, as we know, exists in capitalist countries. Now this "inferiority" is wholly conditioned by the social structure of those countries. But unwilling to see this, Freud argued that because of the anatomic differences between the sexes the women themselves see themselves as having been subjected to castration and think it wrong to regard "both sexes as equal in social position and worth." (*Letters*, Vol. V, pp. 196-197.)

It certainly is unthinkable that a scientifically unacceptable theory can offer an acceptable methodology even in one area, the area of treating nervous and psychic disorders.

Because of their disregard of the patho-physiological bases of neuro-psychic disorders, the circle of which is excessively and impermissibly enlarged by the proponents of psychoanalysis, the psychoanalysts underestimate the importance of modern methods of medicinal treatment.

Psychoanalytic therapy fixes its attention on the sexual aspect in the life of the patients. This unavoidably leaves a heavy imprint on the patients, gives them a wrong orientation, and results in moral trauma.

The psychoanalytic method of treatment, furthermore, fixes the patient's attention on the distant past, on early childhood, even on the prenatal period. This too pulls the patients away from the present, from the real conflicts in their immediate existence, and from their real and immediate perspectives. Surely it can scarcely be thought that the neuroses developed by an unemployed worker who has been deprived of a livelihood for himself and his family, by a mother who has lost a child, and by a do-nothing whose neurosis arose out of idleness and boredom, out of satiation and lack of any interests, all spring essentially from the same causes that had had their origin in the remote past. We hold that, while due consideration must be given to early, real, proved, and not imagined psychological trauma, the doctor's main attention in the treatment of neurotics must be centered on their present life, on the perspectives of the immediate future; that in the process of psychotherapy the physician must keep closer to what presently disturbs the patient.

Psychoanalysts cite positive results allegedly obtained through psychoanalytic treatment. The apparent cures of which they boast are, however, in fact but temporary improvements. Such improvements have also been obtained by witch doctors with patients who had blind faith in them. These seeming cures have been known since ancient times, the results of most varied "healing" methods. These are all based on the power of suggestion, the physiological nature of which has been established by Pavlov and his followers. In this

connection, we can refer to the many observations appearing in the literature abroad indicating how unstable are the results obtained by the methods of psychoanalytic treatment.

The source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among people. Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system, in particular, the mental and physical strain resulting from painful experiences (psychic traumas).

This makes possible the development of sound methods for the prevention of neurotic and other psychic disorders. A knowledge of the physiological mechanisms of neuroses makes possible rational medical and psychotherapeutic action.

It is quite different with psychoanalytic theory which reduces the problem of therapy to the digging up and baring of "complexes" of "suppressed desires" in the realm of the unconscious.

As we see it, Freudism finds itself in crying contradiction to the optimistic tendencies of modern progressive science. Instead of exact knowledge based on experiment and verified in life, it proffers arbitrarily concocted hypothetical schemes. Instead of paying proper regard to the potency of human reason, Freudism asserts that man and his knowledge are under the sway of elemental inborn forces. Instead of viewing man as the product of socio-historical development, an integral part of his social milieu, Freudism, in substance, affirms the unrelatedness of man's conduct to the multiplicity of external conditions.

Is it not clear that human progress cannot be achieved by irrational and teleological investigations?

Only true science, based on principles of materialistic cognition, will secure the further development of human knowledge and help achieve significant successes in revealing ever more of nature's secrets.

We see Freudism as a form of reaction to the magnificent successes of materialistic scientific knowledge in the fields of physiology and medicine. In this it is not alone. Among the reactionary forces arrayed against genuine science belongs everything that bases itself not on principles of exact scientific method, but on speculative constructions masked as science.

In a fit of candor, Freud himself admitted in a letter to Einstein that his activity was an adventure in science. This, it seems to me, is the most significant of all of Freud's utterances. Freudism was and is an admitted instance of adventure in science. This is the reason why in our country it enjoys neither popularity nor respect. **P A S**

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## A psychoanalyst Replies

Norman Reider, M.D.

It was kind of the editors to ask me to write a reply to Dr. Fedotov's comments about psychoanalysis. It is with mixed feelings that I have agreed to do so, because it is a sort of useless gesture to reply in any polemic way to old arguments which are largely derivative of an official governmental stand of long duration in the Soviet Union, which are not the result of an investigatory openminded attitude towards the nature of psychoanalysis, and which arguments have been answered over and over again in the scientific literature. Nevertheless, the hopelessness of convincing Dr. Fedotov to his satisfaction is somewhat mitigated by the anticipation of a receptiveness on the part of readers to the possibility that Dr. Fedotov's arguments are not the last word in the matter.

I cannot resist the temptation to pick point by point most of the arguments of minor nature throughout Dr. Fedotov's discourse and to attempt to answer them briefly, after which

I proceed to what I consider the more valid scientific grounds for the difference of opinion.

By way of initial summary, it can be said that Dr. Fedotov simply does not understand psychoanalysis or he would not write the way he does. For example, he states that Freud and his followers have been unable to find a method for the objective exploration of the physiology of the brain. It seems that to Dr. Fedotov psychology can only be neurophysiological psychology. Freud made it clear that he left the problems of the biology of man to the biologist, and of the physiology to the physiologist. It is also amply clear to Freud and his followers that there is no dichotomy between psyche and soma as Dr. Fedotov would have once believe. Freud was primarily concerned with the psychic representation of biological phenomena and not their physiology or chemistry, a fact that has never been grasped by many of his critics. Freud did not consider anatomical, chemical, and physiological theories as irrelevant. He considered them quite important in their own field and he even went so far as to express the expectation that some day chemical means would be the method of treating all psychiatric conditions.

An example that Dr. Fedotov gives as the horrendous result of the alleged separating off of psyche from soma in psychoanalytic considerations is a brief quotation from Dr. Franz Alexander about the etiology of ulcers. This criticism of one aspect of research in the psychic aspects of the etiology of ulcers, having mainly to do with libidinal derivatives, is incorrectly represented as being the psychoanalyst's consideration of the total etiology. Psychoanalysis from Freud on have acknowledged that the constitutional diathesis and numerous external factors play very significant roles in all psychosomatic conditions such as ulcers, and they make no bones about it. That they happen to be interested to a great measure in the distribution and fate of certain kinds of libidinal energy in psychosomatic conditions is as much justified as when a biochemist is concerned in highly specialized studies in the cellular metabolism of the tubercle bacillus. One might criticize such work in the problem of tuberculosis in regard to many aspects, but one has no right to say that such work is valueless because it does not point out sufficiently the social factors in the etiology of tuberculosis. This is in effect what Dr. Fedotov does.

Nowhere does Dr. Fedotov show his lack of knowledge of Freud's concepts more than in his statement that the import of the external world in psychoanalytic theory is extremely limited; the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious as having an influence on man's conscious life by no means carries the implication that man is thus fenced off from the world, "from the reality of which he is a part." This is a naive conclusion that is not an inherent part of psychoanalytic theory in the slightest. Nor are Freud's early pessimistic views on the inevitability of war necessarily derivative from his own theories. Apparently Dr. Fedotov is not acquainted with Freud's later opinions on war which were considerably more optimistic. But, alas, it seems that Freud's earlier sociological speculations have had more verification than his later ones.

Surely to attribute to Freud or to his followers any view that they "advise the providing of children with 'atomic toys,' with comics wallowing in atrocious crimes," sounds as if Dr. Fedotov has fallen prey to a mite of propaganda. I know of no psychiatrists, whether of psychoanalytic persuasion or not, who "advise" such practices; I think that at worst a psychiatrist might on one occasion or another resignedly condone them, realizing his relative ineffectiveness in changing the world.

Equally striking in Dr. Fedotov's evidence of misunderstanding of psychoanalysis is the statement that "psychoanalytic theory denies the historical development of man and his psyche." It is the essential core of psychoanalytic theory that it is a genetic psychology, a psychology that places central importance upon the historical development of the psyche. Moreover, it is more explicit in its attempts to show how instinctual forces, which are biologically determined, are constantly undergoing changes under the influence of external factors, a dialectical concept which has more universal applicability than anything that has derived out of Pavlovian neurophysiology or any other system of psychology, at least to date.

It is also true that psychoanalytic theory has entered into considerations of sociology, criminology, art, literature and other fields of human endeavor, again via a universality due to the nature of the theory, a claim which cannot be made by Bechterev's or Pavlov's reflexology.

There is a curious contradiction in Dr. Fedotov's arguments. He attacks psychoanalysis as being ahistoric and then he attacks its treatment method as laying emphasis upon individual history. The same sort of curious contradiction exists in his remark that the source of neuroses is traceable to the social relations among people, a hypothesis which, after agreement as to definition of terms, would be quite acceptable to psychoanalysts as a partial explanation of the phenomenon of neurosis. But Dr. Fedotov continues that, "Neuroses, as Pavlov thought, are affections conditioned by the imposition of excessive demands on the nervous system." Now just what this has to do with social relations among people is not clear, nor is it then clear why such great emphasis is placed upon the medical treatment of neuroses which are caused by social relations. Should they not, therefore, be treated by social means exclusively? Yes and no, I suppose.

This sort of polemic discussion could be continued, but I shall leave these pleasantries to get to the basic issue. For some reason or other there has been a failure of Soviet psychologists to recognize the real essence of Freudian psychology. Their main attack stems largely from the fact that they appreciate some of Freud's concepts as being "idealistic" rather than materialistic. This is quite strange, especially since equally vehement attacks upon psychoanalysis have been made by "reactionaries," who agree with the official definition of Freudianism in the 1955 Soviet edition of the Short Philosophic Dictionary as a science "developing the basest and most repellant instinctual tendencies" - only they call it materialistic and not idealistic! The point is that the theologian's arguments that Freudianism has biologic roots are much closer to the roots than the Soviet view. Yet both fear it (or at least do not like it) and it is interesting to examine why. My own hunch is that all totalitarian systems have to oppose psychoanalytic theory since one of its sociological implications is that of putting the welfare of the individual above the welfare of the state. This by no means settles the question, I fully realize.

What is likewise important is that there exists a considerable literature, reference to which can most easily be found in Jones's third volume of his biography of Freud, just recently published, of extensive discourses on psychoanalysis as dialectical materialism in psychology; this point of view has become quite unfashionable in recent years, perhaps regrettably so - and, then again, perhaps not - but at any rate these arguments are quite cogent and most interesting. Perhaps the Soviet psychologists have no access to the psychoanalytic literature of the 20s and 30s, and that is why such references are absent in the critique. Who knows?

To return : Freud discovered a method, analogous to those methods by which man's urine, sputum, feces, heart sounds, brain waves, and gastric contents can be subjected to analysis and investigation; Freud found a way by which man's dreams, thoughts, wishes, actions, imaginations aspirations, reveries, and impulses can be studied. He modeled his own theoretical considerations on those of the physical sciences and achieved a consistent theory of the structure of the psychic apparatus, one of the greatest achievements of the intellect, even though he himself humbly called it an "adventure in science," a subtlety which escapes Dr. Fedotov. Psychoanalysis, as a result of his efforts, is not only a theory but it has now become a body of knowledge and carries along with it a practice based upon the theory. The everchanging and inquiring attitude of the relationship of the theory to the practice, not nearly as doctrinaire as many of its opponents would like to believe, is a remarkable advance in scientific psychology, one which many so-called dialectical materialists would envy if they dared to understand it and give it a try.

Psychoanalysis has its defects in its theory and certainly in its practice, but none of these are those that Dr. Fedotov mentions. **P A S**